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NOTES ON SOFTWARE AND DOCUMENTATION 
 
The experimental markets in this thesis were created on a local area network of Windows-based 
computers using markets developed by the author in Powersim Constructor version 2.51. The data 
coming from the experimental markets were compiled in Microsoft Office Excel version 2013. 
The autospectra and autocorrelograms were done using MATLAB version R2012b.  The simulations 
of the decision rules with the parameter estimates were done in Microsoft Office Excel version 2013. 
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At the first years of deregulation, the academic discussion was first oriented to discuss the short-
term efficiency and competitiveness of the electricity markets. Now, after more than twenty years 
of deregulation, the issue of the long-term security of supply has become increasingly relevant. A 
number of authors have used simulations and laboratory experiments to study capacity mechanisms 
in order to address this issue.  
This thesis explores the rationality of individuals’ decisions in a set of pilot experimental markets to 
test capacity mechanisms in electricity markets. We start from a previous experiment as base case, 
which is presented by Arango and Moxnes (2012).Thereafter; we take the second treatment with 
the capacity mechanism Procurement for long strategic reserve planning, by introducing a 
regulatory firm to the base case market. The third treatment test the capacity mechanism 
Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts, by introducing an auction for licenses system. We 
compare three treatments with six pilot experimental markets, two per treatment. We evaluate the 
performance in terms of the market’s long-term security of supply and the society’s welfare.  
Results from the pilot experiments provides only initial indications about the experiment. In 
Treatments 1 and 2, the experimental results show evidence of cyclical behavior in both prices and 
capacities. On the other hand, in Treatment 3, the experimental results show a more stable behavior 
due to the introduced auction for licenses system. Although the simulation tests indicate that both 
Treatments 2 and 3 should exhibit more stable behaviors in prices and capacities than Treatment 1, 
Treatment 2’s experimental results do not represent an improvement with respect to Treatment 1’s 
ones. In fact, results suggest that the regulatory firm introduced by Treatment 2 -Procurement for 
long strategic reserve planning- represents the less desirable scenario for market actors. On the 
contrary, Treatment 3’s experimental results are consistent with the simulation tests. In addition, 
the auction for licenses system introduced by Treatment 3 Centralised auctioning for capacity 
contracts- leads to more stable behaviors than both Treatments 1 and 2 results. These results 
suggest, first, that the Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts could help to stabilize the 
market without significant costs for the society’s welfare, and second, that the Procurement for long 
strategic reserve planning may not lead to any price stabilization or society’s welfare improvement. 












En los primeros años de la desregulación, la discusión académica fue primeramente orientada a 
discutir la eficiencia y competitividad de los mercados de electricidad en el corto plazo. Ahora, 
después de más de veinte años de la desregulación, la cuestión de la seguridad de suministro en el 
largo plazo es cada vez más relevante. Un número de autores han utilizado simulaciones y 
experimentos de laboratorio para estudiar los mecanismos de capacidad con el fin de abordar esta 
cuestión. 
En esta tesis se analiza la racionalidad de las decisiones de los individuos en un conjunto de 
mercados experimentales piloto para poner a prueba los mecanismos de capacidad en los mercados 
eléctricos. Partimos de un experimento anterior como caso base, que es presentado por Arango y 
Moxnes (2012). A partir de entonces, Tomamos el segundo tratamiento con el mecanismo de 
Contratación de capacidad para la planificación estratégica de reservas, mediante la introducción 
de una firma reguladora para el mercado de caso base. El tercer tratamiento prueba el mecanismo 
Subastas centralizadas para contratos de capacidad, mediante la introducción de una subasta para 
el sistema de licencias. Comparamos tres tratamientos con seis mercados experimentales piloto, 
dos por tratamiento. Evaluamos el desempeño de los mecanismos en términos de seguridad de 
suministro en el largo plazo y el bienestar de la sociedad de mercado. 
Los resultados de los experimentos piloto proporcionan sólo indicaciones iniciales sobre el 
experimento. En los tratamientos 1 y 2, los resultados experimentales muestran evidencia de 
comportamiento cíclico en los precios y las capacidades. Por otra parte, en el tratamiento 3, los 
resultados experimentales muestran un comportamiento estable debido a la introducción de las 
subastas por licencias. A pesar que las pruebas de simulación indican que tanto el Tratamiento 2 y 
3 deberían exhibir comportamientos más estables en precios y capacidades que el tratamiento 1, 
los resultados experimentales del tratamiento 2 no representan una mejora con respecto a los 
resultados del tratamiento 1. De hecho, los resultados sugieren que la firma reguladora introducida 
en por Tratamiento 2 – Contratación para la planificación de reservas estratégicas a largo plazo- 
representa el escenario menos deseable para los actores de mercado. Por otra parte, los resultados 
experimentales del tratamiento 3 son consistentes con las pruebas de simulación. Adicionalmente, 
el sistema de licencias introducido en el tratamiento 3 - Subastas centralizadas por licencias de 
capacidad- lleva a comportamientos más estables que los presentados por los tratamientos 1 y 2. 
Estos resultados sugieren, primero, que las Subastas centralizadas para los contratos de capacidad 
podrían ayudar a estabilizar el mercado sin costos significativos para el bienestar de la sociedad y 
segundo, que la Contratación para la planificación de reservas estratégicas a largo plazo podría no 
conducir ninguna estabilización de precios o mejora para el bienestar de la sociedad. 
Palabras clave: mercados de electricidad, mecanismos de capacidad, toma de decisiones, 






Since deregulation, electricity markets have had substantial changes in their structure and 
dynamics. After the Second World War, society’s need for efficient services brought with it a series 
of questioning remarks about the state-owned monopoly paradigm that had ruled the management 
of the electricity industry for decades (Jaccard, 1995). To address this issue, many countries 
considered to restructure their electricity industries by introducing competition within them (Barker 
et al., 1994). By attracting private capitals and setting rules for competition, the electricity industry 
would go from a state-owned monopoly to a market that benefits society or i.e. competition would 
improve society’s welfare. 
The new management paradigm in the electricity industry carries a series of changes For instance, 
major changes such as the increase in the number of stakeholders along with a change in the 
management focus and planning methods, makes the electricity industry a more complex system 
than it was before deregulation (Dyner and Larsen, 2001; Larsen and Arango, 2013). 
One could expect the market actors to have a good understanding of such markets after more than 
two decades of deregulation experience. However, there is evidence that deregulation still presents 
important difficulties for the market actors, as it presented in previous years (e.g. Slow transition in 
the business rationale, planning methods and a new consumer focus) (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 
2006; Larsen and Arango, 2013). Thus, while in the initial stages of deregulation, the academic 
discussion was oriented to short-term concerns such as market efficiency and competitiveness 
(Joskow, 2008), the discussion is now focused on the long-term security of supply (IEA, 2003, 2007). 
One particular concern about the long-term security of supply is the possibility of the occurrence of 
cycles in prices, driven by periods of under-capacity followed by periods of overcapacity and vice 
versa (Green, 2006; Roques, 2008). Different scholars have found indications that cycles may occur 
in electricity markets using different methodologies such as simulation (Bunn and Larsen, 1994; 
Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006), laboratory experiments (Arango and Moxnes, 2012), and by 
making analogies with other industries such as real estate and aluminum (Ford, 1999; Krapels and 
Stagliano, 1996; IEA, 2002). Nowadays, after more than 2 decades of deregulation, there is evidence 
of occurrecy of such cycles in Chile and UK (Arango and Larsen, 2011). The importance of this 
concern is justified by the adverse effects caused by capacity cycles. On the one hand, a period of 
under-capacity leads to high prices for consumers, and possibly shortages and blackouts. On the 
other hand, a period with overcapacity leads to low profit margins for electricity companies, with 
the possibility of bankruptcy for the weakest of them (Arango and Larsen, 2011). 
Given that a market structure implies competition among agents, any effort to intervene in the 
natural investment dynamics will be contrary to competition as a market principle (Fignon and 
Pignon, 2008). Therefore, the market behavior is caused by the individual behavior of investors 
(Larsen and Arango, 2013). If we assume perfect rationality on the part of the investors, we can 
expect little or no cyclical tendency in the market, but if we assume non-perfect rationality, we can 
have investment concentration in periods where the prices are high. Such concentration leads to 
periods of excess capacity and low prices, which discourages investment due to the reduced profit 




investment concentration in such periods due to the high prices and so, the cycle is generated (Bunn 
and Larsen, 1994; Ford, 1999; Roques, 2008). 
To address the issue of long-term security of supply and, particularly, to eliminate or at least mitigate 
the occurrence of cycles, several capacity mechanisms 1have been studied. In fact, there are some 
real power market implementation experiences (Barroso et al., 2006; Cámac et al., 2006; CEER, 
2006; Cramton and Stoft, 2006; Fignon and Pignon, 2008), studies with different research 
methodologies (Liu et al., 2010; van der Veen et al., 2012; Arango et al., 2013) and theoretical 
proposals (Zou, 2009; Fu and Ren, 2011) of capacity mechanisms. All capacity mechanisms seek to 
induce rather than force an investment behavior that could lead to stable prices, minimizing the 
intervention in the market. 
To analyze market mechanisms’ effectiveness, some authors have employed simulation (Zou, 2009; 
van der Veen et al., 2012) and laboratory experiments (Arango et al., 2013), while others have 
acknowledged the benefits of using both in conjunction (Liu et al., 2010). We use both simulation 
and laboratory experiments to evaluate both mechanisms’ potential for price stabilization and their 
impact on society’s welfare. 
This thesis is an extension of Arango and Moxnes (2012) where we study two capacity mechanisms, 
namely Procurement for long-term strategic reserve planning and Centralized auctioning for 
capacity contracts. We use Arango and Moxnes’ extension of the Cobweb theorem2 to test both 
mechanisms. The thesis is organized as follows: chapter 2 presents the problem formulation. 
Chapter 3 presents the objectives of the thesis. Chapter 4 presents the theoretical framework with 
the literature survey. Chapter 5 presents the experimental design and the experimental procedure. 
Chapter 6 presents the hypothesis of this work. Chapter 7 presents the experimental results and, 









                                                          
1 Capacity mechanisms are a set of market rules, implemented in a market to secure that such market’s 
needs for capacity are met. 
2 The Cobweb Theorem is part of the classic economic classic theory and postulates that demand responds to 
price immediately, but supply responds with a one period lag. The model oscillates with a period equal to 
twice the production lag. Besides, depending on the assumptions about price elasticity, the oscillations may 




2. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
 
The long-term security of supply is matter of great importance for society, and an obligation for the 
electricity industry (IEA, 1999, 2003). While in the regulated scheme the planning of the system 
relies heavily in traditional optimization and centralized planning (Arango and Larsen, 2013), in 
deregulated electricity markets the supply depends directly on the investments made by the agents, 
which means that security of supply relies on investment behavior and activity. 
In a regulated market, a government agency makes the plans for expansion with their associated 
costs. To prevent shortages, this centralized expansion planning often leads to overcapacity 
scenarios (IEA, 2002). In opposition, there is no such generalized planning in deregulated electricity 
markets, where investors are profits maximizers in principle. In fact, the investors’ focus on these 
investments determines the security of supply of the system (IEA, 2002). If the investors are 
primarily driven by price signals (periods with high prices) the market could present pronounced 
price cycles caused by sequences of periods with over and under-capacity (Bunn and Larsen, 1994; 
Gary and Larsen, 2000). Nevertheless, if the investors take a strategic, long-term approach to make 
their investments, the market could present a stable price behavior, which gives the investors a 
return close to the normal profit3, where market signals are expected to provide long-term security 
of supply (secure investment). In other words, the long-term security of supply in deregulated 
electricity markets depends on the investors’ rationality (Arango and Larsen, 2011). 
The occurrence of cycles can cause a great deal of harm to both producers and consumers (Bunn 
and Larsen, 1992; Ford, 1999; Bidwell and Henney, 2004; White, 2005; Green, 2006). If there are 
periods of capacity deficit, with high prices, there could be eventual shortages and blackouts, thus 
the consumers are seriously affected. Thereafter, herd behavior on the part of the investors could 
occur in periods of high prices, which causes subsequent periods of excess capacity with low prices, 
thus the generation companies face economic loses, with the risk of bankruptcy for the weakest of 
them (Arango and Larsen, 2011). 
There is a generalized concern about the occurrence of cycles in electricity markets (Bunn and 
Larsen, 1992, 1994; IEA, 1999, 2002, 2007; de Vries and Hakvoort, 2004; Kadoya et al., 2005; White, 
2005; Green, 2006; Roques, 2008). However, to determine the existence of such behavior, it is 
imperative to have historical data of the development of some deregulated electricity markets with 
a corresponding evaluation (Sioshansi and Pfaffenberger, 2006). Consider, for instance, the analysis 
done by Arango and Larsen (2011) about the three oldest deregulated electricity markets: Chile (in 
operation since 1986), England and Wales (in operation since 1990) and the Nordpool (in operation 
since 1991). Arango and Larsen (2011) shows the development of the reserve margin in each of the 
three markets. The reserve margin has been used as an indicator of the long–term reliability of 
electricity markets, as it relates the difference between installed capacity and peak demand with 
the current amount of installed capacity (IEA, 2002; Joskow, 2008). The inter-annual reserve margin 
is defined as: 
                                                          
3 The normal profit is the profit that the producers of a good make when the market reaches perfect 
equilibrium, that is, when the benefit for society is maximized. The normal profit is commonly presented as 





𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =  
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
  x 100% 
 
Even when the reserve margin does not take into account some elements, such as geographical 
distributions, potential imports, the availability of fuel/water for generation and the age of the 
capacity (IEA, 2002), the reserve margin does show the long-term relationship between installed 
capacity and demand. Figure 1 shows the development of the reserve margin for the Chilean 
market, the Nordpool market, and the England and Wales market. Table 1 shows the summary 
statistics of the reserve margin for the three markets. 
 
 
Figure 1: Development of the reserve margin in the Chilean market, the Nordpool market, and the England and Wales 
market. Source: Arango and Larsen (2011). 
Market Average Std dev 𝛼1 𝛼2 Period length 
Chile 0.43 0.10 0.45 -0.26 7.7 
Nordpool 0.26 0.04 0.41 0.20 9.5 
England and 
Wales 
0.37 0.06 0.65 0.47 19.0 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for the Chilean market, the Nordpool market and the England and Wales market (average 
of the reserve margin, standard deviation, first and second lag autocorrelations and period length. Source: Arango 





The autocorrelation for the first lag is significantly greater than zero for all three markets (Table 1, 
Arango and Larsen, 2001), which indicates a likely cyclical behavior. Moreover, it is interesting to 
note the resemblance between the actual data and the simulations presented by Ford (1999) on 
cyclical behavior. Moreover, Arango and Larsen (2011) point out the apparent lack of cycles 
occurrence in the Nordpool market; they suggest that one explanation could be that the period 
length of the cycles for that market is more than 15 years and thus the cycle would not be captured 
by the available data. By performing laboratory experiments, Arango and Moxnes (2012) conclude 
that there is no decisive evidence to either reject or support the cycle’s occurrence hypothesis. 
At this point, we need to point out the role of delays in the occurrence of cycles. There is a time 
when an investment decision is made. At that time, the investors make price forecasts; determine 
their power plants’ utilization and form expectations about future profitability. Such time 
constitutes a first delay. The second delay is the time between the decision-making and the 
materialization of that decision, i.e., construction time, the time to get the permissions to build a 
new power plant, the time needed to get money loans, etc. Such delays add complexity to the 
market and therefore they are an important source of market instabilities (Bunn and Larsen, 1992; 
Ford, 1999) 
Other indications of cycle’s occurrence in electricity markets come from comparisons or analogies 
with similar industries. The structural elements in the electricity industry are investors that face 
large capital investments, long construction times, high fixed costs and seek a high utilization rate 
to recover such costs. Some of these analogous industries are aluminium (Newbery, 1995), copper 
(Brennan and Schwartz, 1985) and oil tankers (Randers and Göluke, 2007). Nevertheless, there are 
still some differences between electricity and these other goods, for instance, electricity cannot be 
stored as inventory, which may imply different correlation in prices for electricity as well as higher 
prices in cycles compared to other commodities (Ford, 1999). This difference has stimulated other 
analogies with industries that share this non-storage characteristic, such as real estate (Ford, 2001), 
where capacity cannot be stored as well. This analogy has shown price swings with tight vacancy 
rates that are similar to the price swings in electricity with tight reserve margins. This particular 
analogy with the real estate industry has generate concerns about the electricity prices showing 
boom and bust behaviors, like the ones seen in real estate (Ford, 2001; IEA, 2002). 
While it is worthy to note that industry analogies offer valuable insights, simulations models provide 
an opportunity to test different scenarios, with different parameters and different decisions rules 
that can be adapted to replicate real markets (Ford, 1999). Some simulation models have shown a 
consistent cycle’s occurrence, with periods of over and under-capacity (Bunn and Larsen, 1992, 
1994; Ford, 1999, 2001; Larsen and Bunn, 1999; Kadoya et al., 2005; Olsina et al., 2006). Besides, 
these models serve to test the sensitivity of the decision rules’ realized performance to different 
parameters, i.e., they help to understand the influence of investment decision inputs in the 
occurrence of cycles. Nevertheless, these parameters and decisions rules are modelled by the 
authors under an assumed rationality and, hence, they may not completely represent the actual 
decision made by real investors. 
To study the decision-making of real decision makers in electricity markets and evaluate their 
performance, Arango and Moxnes (2012) carried out a series of experiments. Starting from the 




complexity increases, the rationality and performance of the decision makers decreases. In a later 
work, Arango et al. (2013) relaxed the restriction of full capacity utilization used in Arango and 
Moxnes (2012), i.e., they allow capacity mothballing (variable capacity utilization), and concluded 
that variable capacity utilization leads to more damped cycles than full capacity utilization does. In 
a further extension of Arango and Moxnes (2012), Alvarez (2013) included future markets in order 
to test their potential to stabilize market prices, finding that the inclusion of future markets seems 
to reduce the cyclical tendency in commodity markets (electricity among them). 
This thesis is a further extension of Arango and Moxnes (2012), where we test two different capacity 
mechanisms that aim to stabilize market prices taken from the literature (Fignon and Pignon, 2008). 
First, we test Procurement for long strategic reserve planning (direct intervention in market’s 
capacity), where we introduce a regulatory firm that invest in the electricity market with predefined 
rules to invest; and second, we test Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts where we use a 
centralized auction market for licenses system (Alcaraz, 2010). We expect to answer some 
questions: can these two mechanisms aid to prevent cycle’s occurrence in electricity market? If not, 
what are the effects of their introduction? Further, what would the expected society´s welfare be if 























3.1. General objective: 
 
Evaluate the stabilization potential of two capacity mechanisms, namely Procurement for 
long strategic reserve planning and Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts, through 
simulation and laboratory experiments. 
 
3.2. Specific objectives: 
 
 
o Study the two mechanisms and how they can be implemented to prevent cycle’s 
occurrence situations. 
 
o Develop a simulation model to evaluate different scenarios of the problem 
 
o Propose some criteria to evaluate the performance of such mechanisms in the 
electricity markets. 
 
o Design laboratory experiments that allow us to study the mechanisms’ 
effectiveness in face of real decision makers. 
 
o Run simulations of the proposed model and evaluate the performance of it in 

















In this chapter, we present a revision of Experimental Economics and a brief review of its 
development in System Dynamics.  
4.1. Experimental Economics: 
 
In Experimental Economics, the experimenter isolates an economic environment to test some 
hypotheses through an experimental design, i.e., she runs a laboratory experiment. Three elements 
are needed to do this. There has to be, first, a goal for the participants to pursue; second, an 
experimental environment (which emulates a real system) with clear decision rules and restrictions; 
and third, the actual decisions of the participants, which determine the behavior captured by the 
experiment (Friedman and Cassar, 2004). 
For instance, a goal could be to maximize profits in a market (Arango and Moxnes, 2012; Arango et 
al., 2013), to stabilize CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere (Moxnes and Saysel, 2009), or even to 
achieve a desired level of drunkenness (Moxnes and Jensen, 2009). With a clear goal, the decision 
rules and restrictions of the experimental design are portrayed. Following the examples, the players 
could be generators in an electricity market (Arango et al., 2013), world leaders determining the 
CO2 emissions policy (Moxnes and Saysel, 2009) or some people who wants to reach a desired level 
of drunkenness (Moxnes and Jensen, 2009). In such settings, the experimenter fixes the goal, 
controls the environment and observes the behavior (Smith, 1994). 
Three of the main concepts in Experimental Economics are the Induced Value, the Parallelism 
(External Validity) and the Internal Validity. The Induced Value states that with an adequate 
incentive, the experimenter can induce a behavior in the participants that serves the experiment’s 
purpose, regardless of the participants’ particular interests (Smith, 1982). The Parallelism, also 
known as External Validity, refers to the level of resemblance between an experimental design and 
the real system, i.e., how much the results of an experiment can tell about reality (Smith, 1982). The 
third concept is the Internal Validity, that is, how adequate is a set of rules and incentives in relation 
with the task required from the participants (Cook and Campbell, 1979). Traditionally, there has 
been a confrontation between the Internal and External Validity (Guala, 2002), in fact, their 
relationship is often described as a trade-off between them (Guala, 2005). If an experiment lacks 
internal validity, then cause and effect relationships cannot be properly determined; if it lacks 
external validity, then the experimental results are of little worth in the understanding of the real 
world (Cook and Campbell, 1979). However, some authors like Jimenez and Miller (2010) have 
shown that such trade-off relationship is not as definitive as the academic discussion may suggest, 
i.e., the experimenter can effectively enhance the two aspects simultaneously. 
Some feature emerge from the Induce Value Theory, which are monotonicity, salience and 
dominance (Smith, 1982). Monotonicity means that participants will always want to have more (or 
less depending on the case) of something specific. For instance, it can be assumed that every person 
would like to have more money income instead of less, and less money liabilities instead of more. 




actions and the other participants’ actions. For instance, if participants know they will be paid 1 
dollar for every unit of experimental money earned in an experimental market, there is salience in 
the experiment, because the experimental earnings are determined by participants’ actions and 
they are aware of that. Dominance means that individual utility4 is only affected by the individual 
payoff. For instance, it is common that participants take interest in knowing the other participants’ 
results to see how they fare in comparison. To ensure dominance, the experimental procedures 
must make sure that each participant does not know and does not have the means to know the 
other participants’ results. Finally, an effective way to ensure that the payoff is really an incentive 
for participants to perform the best they can is to offer cash payments that exceed the participants’ 
opportunity cost (Friedman and Cassar, 2004). 
The limitations of Experimental Economics are mainly related with Smith’s (1982) concept of 
Parallelism previously introduced. Smith explains that even when an experimental design cannot 
capture all the complexities of a real system, the underlying behavior will present itself in reality if 
the experiment conditions are satisfied. This statement implies that if a single laboratory experiment 
does not answer all the questions of a given phenomenon, or does not include some relevant 
features of the real system, another laboratory experiment should be run to address this issue. The 
method of Experimental Economics is well presented by Friedman and Cassar (2004) and its main 
findings are well presented in The Handbook of Experimental Economics Results (Plott and Smith, 
2008). 
4.2. Experimental Economics and System Dynamics: 
 
System Dynamics is a simulation methodology, which allows the construction of models that 
represents some complexities of real world systems (Hasani and Hosseini, 2011). Among the 
advantages of this methodology are the possibility to capture feedback cycles, delays and nonlinear 
relationships between variables. Moreover, System Dynamics allows the modeler to replicate the 
system structure and to know how such structure induces the system behavior (Ponzo et al., 2010). 
On this line, System Dynamics is a powerful way to make laboratory experiments that replicates 
complex environments such as electricity markets (Arango et al., 2013), supply chains (Cantor and 
Katok, 2012) and natural resources markets (Moxnes, 2012), among others.  
Experiments with System Dynamics models have been used to test decision-making processes 
(Sterman, 1989a, 1989b; Moxnes, 1998a, 1998b), finding interesting results that highlight people’s 
weak mental models when it comes to decide about complex problems. These results suggest that 
people use some simple decision rules or heuristics (Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974). Such decision 
rules serve as a rough guide to make decisions when the complexity of the task overwhelms 
individuals’ rational capacity as Bounded Rationality theory explains (Simon, 1955, 1979; Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Kleinmuntz, 1993). The method of Experimental Economics in System 
Dynamics and its main findings are presented by Arango et al. (2012). In the next chapter, we 
present our theoretical framework and literature review for capacity mechanisms 
                                                          
4 Utility is an economic construct that aims to represent the well-being of a person when she faces a certain 




5. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
In this chapter, we discuss some principals for the evaluation of a capacity mechanism found in the 
literature.  Thereafter, we present some of the most discussed mechanisms in the literature.  
5.1. Capacity mechanisms evaluation: 
 
Capacity mechanisms are sets of market rules that aim to ensure that a market’s needs for 
production capacity are met. One of the main concern in the design and implementation of capacity 
mechanisms is to have unified criteria to assess their stabilization potential in electricity markets. 
The main goal for a capacity mechanism is to secure long-term security of supply, but that raises 
concerns about what is needed in capacity mechanism to do so. Fignon and Pignon (2008) present 
a comprehensive survey of the academic discussion regarding such concern and present seven 
commonly agreed evaluation parameters: 
The efficiency of capacity adequacy targeting: 
One of the main aspects to evaluate in a capacity mechanism is the time in which it can help to 
achieve a desired level of reliability in the market (Weitzman, 1974; Roberts and Spence, 1976; 
Joskow, 2006). Therefore, it is of great importance to determine how long it would take a 
mechanism to achieve a capacity goal for a market. 
Securing the profitability of new peaking units: 
A mechanism with a long-term adequacy must secure the profitability of new investment, i.e., it 
must support that extra capacity that gives reliability to the system. By securing this profitability, 
the mechanism ensures that investors maintain a long-term capacity goal for the market (Turvey, 
2003).   
The consistency of the mechanism with the energy market: 
Although the primary interest of a mechanism should be the long-term stability of supply, i.e., 
society’s welfare, it has to be designed with market considerations (e.g., the benefits for investors). 
Otherwise, the market might end up with an excess in capacity with the related low prices and low 
profits, which makes the market less sustainable as it is a less attractive investment opportunity 
(Perez-Arriaga, 2001). 
 Incentives to generation availability: 
The reliability of an electricity market is strongly related to how the response of the generators is in 
the face of lack-of-supply scenarios. A good capacity mechanism must ensure that generators have 
proper incentives to attend this kind of scenarios when it is needed (Oren, 2005).  
Robustness to the exercise of strategic behavior: 
A capacity mechanism can be understood as a set of new rules that are added to a set of pre-existing 
market rules. Hence, a mechanism must present opportunities for benefit maximization to the 





This aspect not only refers to the compatibility of a mechanism with the existing legal framework of 
a market, but it also refers to what extent the mechanism can be implemented in any given country, 
regardless of its political and economic situation (Vasquez et al., 2003). 
Effectiveness of the mechanism in an open market: 
A capacity mechanism must consider the relationships among different electricity markets. In other 
words, how does the implementation of a given mechanism affect the market’s interactions with 
other markets? (Creti and Fabra, 2004). 
Having presented the criteria to evaluate capacity mechanisms, in the next section we proceed to 
show a survey of the most discussed ones in the literature. We leave the selected two for the last. 
5.2. Mechanisms survey: 
 
Before we present the two capacity mechanism studied in this thesis, namely Procurement for long 
strategic reserve planning and Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts, we present a brief 
description and evaluation of some of the most discussed capacity mechanisms in the literature.  
1. Capacity payment:  
With this mechanism, a capacity goal for the system is fixed in such a way that the decentralized 
decisions of the investors lead to that goal. In mathematical terms, the payment can be explained 
as the equality between capacity’s shadow price in a scenario of full capacity utilization and the cost 
to install a new capacity unit (Weitzman, 1974). 
This mechanism has been implemented in Spain, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Perú and it has 
shown both theoretical and practical problems. The main problem is the lack of control over the 
capacity statements of generators at any given time, which makes this mechanism one of the least 
recommended in the literature (Batlle et al., 2007). 
2. Reliability charge: 
This mechanisms aims to give economic incentives to generators that are able to support eventual 
energy deficits in the market, i.e. those generators with reserve capacity that give reliability to the 
system. Colombia implemented the reliability charge in 2006 (Dyner et al., 2008) as a way to solve 
the needs for supply the country had by stabilizing the generators’ income based on a payment 
related with their generation availability. Now, the effects of this implementation over the MMEC 
(Mercado Mayorista de Electricidad Colombiana) remain unclear. 
3. Capacity obligations with exchangeable rights: 
This mechanism is based on the decentralization of quantities, in which the main generators 
represent the consumers’ needs for reliability. In other words, the main generators acquire 
commitments with the consumers that can be traded in the market (Wolak, 2004). In this sense, a 




have reserve capacity and use it when needed. In addition, this right of being part of the main 
generators can be traded with others interested generators. 
Some states of the USA have implemented this mechanism, presenting some practical 
implementation issues like the duration of the commitments and difficulties with the selling of them 
(Cramton and Stoft, 2006). 
4. Margin Clearing Price (Uniform Price): 
This mechanism is a way to determine the prices for specific auctions with generators. These 
auctions are decided based on the production’ price offered by different generators. Therefore, it 
has been the conventional auction system for generators, given that it aims to attend specific 
market’s production needs at the lowest price (aims to minimize system’s cost). It also attempts to 
enforce competition by giving the generators a significant freedom to bid (Liu et al., 2010) 
Regarding its evaluation, the MCP is considered to have a great potential to promote competition 
in a market. It also offers less risk to generators due to a less rigid price regulation, i.e., less risk to 
have low prices because of the mechanism. However, it does present larger prices’ fluctuations than 
the more rigid mechanisms (Bouttes, 2005) 
5. Pay as Bid: 
It appears as a response to the Margin Clearing Price (Uniform Price). In this mechanism, the bidding 
margin is reduced for the generators; thus, the market creates an acceptable range of price instead 
of deciding a price based on marginal offerings. Therefore, a generator receives the same price of 
its bid as long as the price is accepted for the price range. This mechanism has been strongly 
promoted by China and the UK as a way to secure less variability in electricity prices by giving the 
generators a smaller range to bid. Under this setting, coalition among generators is discouraged and 
a higher society’s welfare is expected (Zhang et al., 2003). 
The evaluation of this mechanism is not yet clear since the countries that have implemented it have 
also incurred in several market reforms that does not allow the evaluation of the mechanism in 
isolation. Furthermore, the discussion of this mechanism has been closely related to the discussion 
of the Margin Clearing Price (Uniform Price), particularly, the change of strategy that comes from 
the generators if one is implemented replacing the other (Zou and Ren, 2007). 
6. Double-sided Auction: 
Zou (2009) proposes this mechanism, in which both sides of the market (supply and demand) 
participate in an auction. The auction winners of each side are selected by their marginal 
contribution to the social welfare, i.e., how much they can increase the social welfare with their 
auction positions. 
According to Zou (2009), simulation models for this mechanism report better results than the ones 
presented with the Margin Clearing Price (Uniform Price) and Pay as Bid mechanisms because a 
double auction limits the strategic options of generators and brings their offers close to their 





7. Imbalancing pricing: 
This mechanism is based on finding the “imbalanced prices”, which are calculated using the 
difference between the desired electricity exchange and two foreseen scenarios for the actual 
electricity exchange (van der Veen et al., 2012). Therefore, two prices are determined: one for cases 
of excess of supply and another one for cases of deficit.  
The idea of determining the two prices based on the supply rather than total costs is own to the fact 
that if the prices were determined by total costs, the system would be bound to higher uncertainties 
and shortages (Weidlich and Veit, 2008). 
8. 𝐶𝑂2 Emissions related mechanisms: 
Some authors have proposed that a CO2 emissions certificates market could be implemented to 
operate alongside the electricity market. This mechanisms aim to incentive generators towards 
production efficiency and cleaner technologies. The authors state that by ensuring an attractive joint 
profitability for both markets, the prices of each would stabilize and society’s welfare would be 
improved, since the generators may regulate their own capacities by getting emissions certificates 
and trading them with other generators (Bompard et al., 2010; Fu and Ren, 2011). 
9. Procurement for long strategic reserve planning: 
In this mechanism, a government institution has the power to demand capacity installment, either 
from the generators or by a state-owned firm (Fignon and Pignon, 2008). Some countries like France, 
Sweden and New Zealand have implemented this mechanism. 
Regarding the evaluation of this mechanism, the literature shows good stabilization results in prices 
(de Vries, 2004). However, some authors present concerns about its counter-market nature since 
through a direct intervention the regulator could have the power to manipulate the market at will 
if there are no constrains for its behavior (Meunier and Finon, 2006).  
On the one hand this mechanism advantages are: 
 Good efficiency of adequacy targeting, good institutional feasibility, and a good robustness for 
strategic behavior (Meunier and Finon, 2006).  
On the other hand, this mechanism disadvantages are: 
 A reduced compatibility with the market (due to its likely counter-market nature) and a non-existing 
operational frame that secures the mechanism effectiveness in an open market (Fignon and Pignon, 
2008)  
10. Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts: 
This mechanism seeks to control the total capacity in a market to later auction it as contracts. By 
auctioning contracts, the government promotes competition in the market, ensures profitability 
incentives and entry of new participants. New England is one of the implementation cases of this 
mechanism (Vasquez et al., 2003). 
Regarding its evaluation, this mechanism presents significant advantages in ensuring investments 




it has shown a remarkable effectiveness for market prices stabilization (Bidwell, 2005; Cramton and 
Stoft, 2006). 
This mechanism advantages are: 
Good efficiency of adequacy targeting, good effectiveness in an open market, good compatibility 
with the market (Bidwell, 2005) 
This mechanism disadvantages are: 
Limited robustness for strategic behavior (since the total market total capacity is beyond agents 
control) and restricted institutional feasibility, given that this mechanism has shown better results 
in mandatory markets that in non-mandatory markets, since in the latter, the bilateral forward sales 
contracts for energy complicates the definition of physical responsibilities (Vasquez et al., 2003)  
We chose these two mechanisms for two main reasons. First, both are frequently discussed in the 
literature and second, they are opposites in nature i.e. the first one is interventionist while the 
second one is market-oriented. In order to test these two last mechanisms we use the work of 
Arango and Moxnes (2012) as our starting point. Arango and Moxnes (2012), replicate markets for 
different types of commodities in a series of System Dynamics based experiments,  and, by gradually 
increasing the market complexity, show how individuals’ rationality decreases when the system 
complexity increases, which results in significant cyclical tendencies in both prices and production 
capacities. However, these authors assumed full capacity utilization in all of their treatments. In 
Arango et al. (2013), the full capacity utilization restriction is relaxed for the last treatment of Arango 
and Moxnes (2012) to replicate an electricity market where agents can decide what percentage of 
their capacity they want to use in generation (between 70% and 100%). The authors show that this 
new element seems to reduce price fluctuations but leads to higher prices in average. In a later 
extension of the last treatment of Arango and Moxnes (2012), Alvarez (2013) introduces futures 
negotiations to the market, finding that the inclusion of futures negotiations also seems to reduce 
the cyclical tendencies of market prices. In this thesis, we use the last treatment of Arango and 
Moxnes (2012) as a base case like other previous works (Arango et al., 2013; Alvarez, 2013) to make 
a further extension of it to evaluate Procurement for long strategic reserve planning and Centralized 
auctioning for capacity contracts. In the next chapter, we present the experimental design we use 











6. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE 
 
In this chapter, we present the experimental design. First, we present the economic model of the 
three treatments considered. Second, we present a brief description of the underlying System 
Dynamics models. Finally, we explain the experimental procedure. 
6.1. Economic model: 
 
Our starting point is a symmetrical experimental market with five players to induce non-collusive 
behavior, and we expect the results to be somewhere between the Cournot-Nash equilibrium5 and 
the Perfect Competition equilibrium6 (Huck et al., 2004). The players can invest freely, but 
considering two restrictions: first, their individual installed capacity cannot be over 20 capacity units 
to ensure a minimum of competition among players; and second, they cannot make investment 
decisions that are less than zero (no negative amounts allowed). We use the investment scheme of 
the fourth treatment of Arango and Moxnes (2012), where the capacity has a 4-year construction 
time and a 16-year lifetime. The players receive feedback about market’s and their own 
performance, and make decisions each year, following a standard Cournot experiment procedure7 
(Huck et al., 2004). A linear, non-negative, inverse demand function of the capacity determines the 
market price. The market price in period t is: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥 {𝐴 − 𝐵∑𝑞𝑖,𝑡
5
𝑖=1
, 0}                                                                                                                       (1) 
 
Where 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the production of player i in period t, and A and B are parameters (A=6, B=0.1, as 
defined by Arango and Moxnes). Following, we present the three experimental treatments. 
Treatment 1: Base case 
We study the same setting as Arango and Moxnes (2012) in their fourth treatment, where players 
invest in a yearly basis and production equals capacity. The production of player i in period t is: 
𝑞𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖,𝑗
𝑗=𝑡−4
𝑗=𝑡−19
                                                                                                                                             (2) 
                                                          
5 Resulting state from a set of actions in a game in which no player can benefit from an individual change of 
strategy if the other players leave theirs unchanged. 
6 Resulting state in a market, where the producers produce as long as there is profit margin and they end up 
earning the normal profit. 
7 The standard conditions are (Huck, 2004, p. 106): (1) interaction takes place in fixed groups. (2) Interaction 
is repeated over a fixed number of periods, (3) products are perfect substitutes, (4) costs are symmetric, (5) 
there is not communication between subjects, (6) subjects have complete information about their own 
payoff functions, (7) subjects receive feedback about the aggregated behavior of the other subjects, and (8) 





Where 𝑥𝑖,𝑗  is the investment decision of player i in period j. The profit function for each player in 
period t is given by: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑃𝑡 −  𝑐)𝑞𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                         (3)  
 
Where 𝑃𝑡 is the market price in period t, 𝑐 is the cost (includes both capital and operational costs) 
and 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the production of player i in period t. 
To guarantee model transparency for the players, we designed an interface where the players 
receive feedback information, year by year, about (1) their total investments, aggregated over  three 
years, (2) their capacities, aggregated over sixteen years, (3) their productions, (4) aggregated 
production of the other players, and (5) total production of the market (see Appendix 3 in Spanish). 
In the System Dynamics mode, we use the same model structure of Arango and Moxnes (2012) for 
all the three treatments. The yearly investments take four years to be part of a player’s production; 
once that production is available, it lasts for 16 years. The sum of the five players’ productions is the 
total market production. As the base case, Treatment 1 uses this structure without modifications. 
Figure 2 shows an aggregated stock and flow diagram of this process. 
 
Figure 2: Representation of the stock and flow diagram for the base case. 
 
Treatment 2: Regulatory firm included 
In this treatment, we use the same scheme we used in the base case. However, now we introduce 
a sixth player in the market, which is a regulatory firm, operated by the model (or the government 
in real life). This firm also invests in capacity, but it only invests if the market production will be less 
than 50 units (perfect competition equilibrium) in four years. The regulator has a capacity limit of 
10 units, which is 20% of the capacity goal, to ensure that it does not have the power to manipulate 

























                                          (4) 
 
We also considered model transparency in this treatment. The players receive all the information 
they received in Treatment 1, plus the information about the regulator’s capacity (See Appendix 3 
in Spanish). In the System Dynamics model, we include a second production structure, which 
corresponds to the regulatory firm. The regulator has the ability to foresee the future market 
production in a four-year horizon. The regulator production is added to the players’ production and 
both determine the total market production. Figure 3 shows a stock and flow diagram of the 
regulator introduction. 
 
Figure 3: Representation of the stock and flow diagram for the regulator introduction – Treatment 2. 
 
Treatment 3: Centralized auctions system included 
In this treatment, we use the same production scheme we used in the previous treatments. 
However, now we introduce a clearing house that auctions each year capacity. We use the auction 
system proposed by Alcaraz (2010). Now, the players have to make bids for licenses to build 
capacity. Accordingly, their new profit function is: 





Where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the number of licences given to player i in period j and 𝐿𝑃𝑡 is the licence’s price in 
period t. 
Since the clearing house controls each year investment, the total production of the market is under 
its control. The market production is fixed to 50 units (perfect competition equilibrium) for all the 
years. This situation implies that the players’ profits are only determined by the trading of licences.  
The licence prices ranges between -2.1 and 2.4. Negative prices means that the government 
subsides the licences and positive prices means that the producers are actually paying for them, 
thus the players benefit from negative prices and lose money with positive prices. In the System 
Dynamics model, this treatment incorporates an auction system. Therefore, players’ investments 
are assigned by a centralized auction. The players make their bids by taking positions in desired 
productions for given licences prices. We used the design presented by Alcaraz (2010). Figure 4 and 
5 show a stock and flow diagram for this treatment. 
 
Figure 4: Stock and flow diagram representation for the auction system introduction – Treatment 3. Source: Alcaraz 
(2010, p. 10). 
 





To ensure model transparency, the players received all the information they received in treatment 
1, plus the information about the licences. Another variation is that in this treatment the players 
decide by drawing graph functions, in which they show how many production units they want, given 
a licence price. They face two restrictions in drawing such function: first, as the price increases, the 
desired production must decrease (to prevent logical errors); and second, the desired production at 
the maximum price (2.4) must be zero for the model to calculate the licenses’ price that results from 
all the biding functions. 
In order to be able to compare results between treatments, Treatments 2 and 3 are linked by the 
fact that both aim to achieve a perfect competition equilibrium, which means they both aim to 
maximize the society’s benefits measured as the sum of the consumers’ surplus8 and the producers’ 
surplus9, i.e., the economic surplus10. 
6.2. Experimental procedure: 
 
We conducted two pilot experimental markets for Treatment 2 and two more for Treatment 3, 
following the Experimental Economics standard procedure (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Friedman 
and Cassar, 2004). Regarding Treatment 1, we used the results of two randomly selected markets 
conducted by Arango and Moxnes (2012) in their original work. All participants were selected 
randomly from the population of fourth to five year students of management and industrial 
engineering at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Medellín, Colombia in the first semester of 
the year 2013. We told participants they could earn a payoff between Col$10.000 and Col$40.000 
(US$5.28 and US$21.23 at the time) in one and a half hours, depending on their performance, which 
was measured in accumulated profits. The payoff exceeded the opportunity cost estimated for the 
students for the duration time of the experiment. 
Participants were organized randomly in the workstations of the experiment, so they were not able 
to identify their competitors in the market. The instructions (see Appendix 2 in Spanish) were 
distributed among participants. After 15 minutes, we gave participants an additional explanation of 
the market dynamics and posted some general questions to make sure they understood their task. 
We asked participants to make their decisions and write them down on a record sheet we gave them 
as a backup for the experiment. We ran the experiments using a computer network with Powersim 
Constructor 2.51. The software runs year by year automatically once all participants have made their 
decision and keeps record of all variables, including participants’ decisions. The experiment 
interfaces are presented in Appendix 3 (in Spanish). The experiment is available upon request. 
 
                                                          
8 The consumer’s surplus is the area defined by the quantity and the difference between the maximum and 
the actual price of the market. 
9 The producer’s surplus is the area defined by the quantity and the difference between the actual price in 
the market and the production cost.   
10 The economic surplus is the sum of the consumer’s surplus and the producer’s surplus. It serves as a 






In this chapter, we present three formal hypotheses with their corresponding theoretical 
backgrounds. The first hypothesis is based on the Perfect Rationality theory, the second one is based 
on the Bounded Rationality theory, and the third one is based on our simulations’ results and the 
evaluations given in the literature of the two mechanisms we consider in this work. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Average prices in all treatments are equal to their respective Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium values.  
The Perfect Rationality theory predicts that there will be a stable price behavior and prices will 
converge to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, as every firm makes profit-maximizing decisions given 
the others’ outputs (Muth, 1961; Huck, 2004). Table 2 shows the values of Joint Maximization, 
Cournot-Nash and Perfect Competition equilibria for each treatment (see Appendix 1 for the 
equilibria derivation). 
 T1 T2 T3 
 ID Cap Price ID Cap Price ID Cap Price 
JM 0.31 25.0 3.50 0.25* 30.0* 3.00 NA NA NA 
CN 0.52 41.7 1.83 0.42* 43.3* 1.67 NA NA NA 
PC 0.63 50.0 1.00 0.50-0.63* 50.0* 1.00 0.63 50.0 1.00 
Table 2: Players individual investments (ID), Market capacity (Cap) and Price for Joint Maximization (JM), Cournot-
Nash (CN) and Perfect Competition (PC) equilibria. *In this treatment, a regulator firm intervenes, so the individual 
investments of the players do not match with the market production (see Appendix 1) 
Since Treatment 3 has a fixed market production by design, the price will always be constant, 
conversely to the other two treatments. Hence, we will need to analyse the licences prices behavior 
separately for this treatment in order to make further comparisons.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Treatments 1 and 2 show cyclical behavior. 
The Bounded Rationality theory poses that human decision makers do not have the capabilities 
assumed by the Perfect Rationality theory. Furthermore, it is expected that individuals make 
satisfying decisions rather than optimal ones (Simon, 1955, 1979). Typically, human decision makers 
use simple decision rules called heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), which serves as tools to 
make decisions without too much mental cost (time and effort spent on making a decision). The 
quality of the decisions driven by heuristics seems to be near optimal when people face simple tasks, 
but the quality reduces as the complexity of the task increases (Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Moxnes, 
2004; Arango y Moxnes, 2012). Therefore, we use an investment heuristic for the decisions in 
Treatments 1 and 2. 
We use the heuristic proposed by Arango and Moxnes (2012) to simulate investment behavior for 





𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝜕𝑖 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡+4 + 𝛾𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+4 + 𝜀𝑖 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑡 +𝜔𝑖, 0)                                 (6)   
 
Where 𝜕𝑖, 𝛾𝑖, 𝜀𝑖, 𝜇𝑖  and 𝜔𝑖 are decisions parameters of player I for depreciation, capacity, expected 
price, actual market price (this four parameters constitute the basic heuristic outcome) and decision 
adjustment with respect to the basic heuristic outcome, respectively. 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡+4 and 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖,𝑡+4, are 
depreciation and capacity for player i four years ahead of period t, 𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the price expected by 
player i for period t, and 𝑃𝑡 is the market price in period t. 
To run the simulations, we assume identical behavior for all the five players, i.e., they have the same 
parameters and values. Therefore, they have the same behavior and results. The parameters we use 
were the same used by Arango and Moxnes (2012),  𝜕𝑖 = -0.02, 𝛾𝑖  = -0.04, 𝜀𝑖  = 0.42, 𝜇𝑖  = 0.16 and 𝜔𝑖 
= 0.54. For this set of parameters, we run simulations for Treatments 1 and 2. Figure 6 shows the 
results for each treatment. 
 
 
Figure 6: Simulations results for Treatments 1 and 2 using the first set of parameters. 
Our first simulations suggest the presence of cycles in Treatments 1 and 2. The inclusion of a 
regulator in Treatment 2 seems to reduce the average amplitude of the cycles but it does not 





We performed several sensitivity analyses to identify the parameters that have the highest influence 
on behavior. Table 3 shows how a 1% increment in each of the parameters can affect price volatility 




Original Standard deviation New Standard deviation Variation (%) 
𝜕𝑖 0.7163 0.7159 -0.05 
𝛾𝑖  0.7163 0.7101 -0.87 
𝜀𝑖  0.7163 0.7164 0.01 
𝜇𝑖  0.7163 0.7154 -0.13 




Original Standard deviation New Standard deviation Variation (%) 
𝜕𝑖 0.2575 0.2575 0.01 
𝛾𝑖  0.2575 0.2605 1.15 
𝜀𝑖  0.2575 0.2615 1.55 
𝜇𝑖  0.2575 0.2585 0.41 
𝜔𝑖 0.2575 0.2614 1.51 
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis of the investment parameters for treatment 1 and 2. 
Table 3 shows that 𝜔𝑖 is the most influencing parameter for Treatment 1 and the second most 
influencing parameter for Treatment 2. Table 3 also shows that 𝛾𝑖  is the second most influencing 
parameter for Treatment 1 and 𝜀𝑖  is the most influencing parameter for Treatment 2. The 
differences are explained by the inclusion of a regulator that invests in the market along with the 
players, which brings different price behaviors and, thus, different influencing parameters. We 
proceed to show how these influencing parameters could enhance/mitigate cyclical behavior in the 
market price. 
For Treatment 1, we first consider joint changes in 𝜔𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖  that could lead to price stabilization. 
We found that a 30% percent increase in both of these parameters would be enough to reduce price 
volatility by almost 90% (89.33%). This means that cycles could be mitigated if players give 
significantly more value to their future capacity and their decision adjustment with respect to the 
basic heuristic outcome i.e. the players change their decision making parameters by giving more 
importance (weight) to their future capacity and decision adjustment. Figure 7 shows the price 
behavior for these new values of 𝜔𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖. It is important to note the low prices and their impact 








Figure 7: Price in Treatment 1 after a 30% percent increase in both 𝜔𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖 (𝜔𝑖  = 0.7 and 𝛾𝑖= -0.03). 
For Treatment 2, we consider joint changes in 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜔𝑖. We found that players could reduce market 
price variability by 45% (-45.25%) by reducing both parameters by 22%. However, any further 
reduction in these parameters will increase the volatility. This means that cycles could be mitigated 
if players give less value (with a maximum reduction of 22%) to their price expectations and their 
decision adjustment with respect to the heuristic basic outcome. Figure 8 shows the market price 
for Treatment 2 when 𝜀𝑖  and 𝜔𝑖 are reduced by 22%, while Figure 9 shows the market price for 
Treatment 2 when such parameters are reduced by 30% with the resulting increases in price 
volatility by more than 100% (+103.57%). 
 
Figure 8: Price in treatment 2 after a 22% decrease in both 𝜀𝑖 and 𝜔𝑖 values.  𝜔𝑖  = 0.42 and   𝜀𝑖= 0.33. 
 




Once again, the changes in price behavior are explained by the interaction between the players and 
the regulator firm. If we assume this heuristic to be a good approximation of the actual decision 
rules the players have, the unlikelihood that five different players make cycle-mitigating 
adjustments to their heuristics lead us to consider the possibility of cycles occurrence as this 
hypothesis states. 
The frequency or periodicity, amplitude and attenuation are the features that characterize cycles in 
a time series. However, such features are not always easy to detect by visual inspections, especially 
when irregular cycles are in place. The variance gives an idea of how much the data is dispersed 
around an average value while the attenuation indicates the variance for different time intervals, 
but neither of these two estimations gives an idea about frequencies or autocorrelations. To study 
these aspects and to test random and cyclical behavior we turn to spectral analysis and 
autocorrelation. 
Spectral analysis: The frequency decomposition of variance is called the autospectrum or the 
autospectral density function. Peaks in the autospectrum indicate that variance is concentrated at 
certain frequencies. This allows detection of both cyclical tendencies and period lengths. For 
instance, white noise has a uniform autospectrum while a sine wave has an autospectrum totally 
concentrated at a single frequency (the period). 
Correlation analysis (autocorrelogram): The autocorrelogram measures the correlation of the 
variable with itself, at different time lags. The autocorrelogram is most directly interpreted as a 
measure of how well future values can be predicted based on past observations. While random 
processes have autocorrelation functions rapidly reduced to zero, cyclicality is observed when there 
are values significantly different from zero at different lags. 
Hypothesis 3: Treatments 2 and 3 present better scenarios for society’s welfare than Treatment 1. 
The literature show that both mechanism may represent significant benefits in terms of economic 
welfare (Fignon and Pingon, 2008). To test this, we first performed a series of simulations for 
Treatment 3, in order to assess the possible behavior of licenses in this treatment. Equation 7 shows 
the proposed heuristic for Treatment 3. 
 
𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝−2.1 =  𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝑀𝑎𝑥(𝑧 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝑀𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓 + 𝑦 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝, 0), 20)           (7) 
 
Where MProf is the market’s profit and Cap is the market’s capacity. z, x, y are parameters estimated 
based on the results reported by Alcaraz (2010). These parameters’ values are z=-10.09, x=1.87 and 
y=1.46. With this initial value, we can determine the heuristic for the subsequent point in the curve, 
and then repeat the process for all the other points. The heuristics for the subsequent points of the 
bidding curve are given by 
 




Where 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝 is desired capacity at a license price𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐿𝐿𝑝−𝑚 is the desired capacity at 
the previous curve point ( 𝑚 is the separation between the curve points), and 𝑖, 𝑙 are 
coefficients estimated for the particular curve point in case (𝐿𝑝, 𝐷𝐶𝑎𝑝𝐿𝑝) using Alcaraz 
(2010) results. Assuming identical behavior on the part of the five players, we simulate the 
licenses’ price behavior. Figure 10 shows the results.  
 
Figure 10: Licenses prices for Treatment 3 using the first set of parameters 
With the auctioning system, the market’s capacity is fixed; therefore, the electricity price is 
stabilized. However, it may present some instability in the licenses price. In this treatment, the 
producers’ profits are only determined by the licenses’ price. This solely dependence in licenses, 
leads the market towards a similar decision making to the ones we observed in the previous cases 
i.e. the market makes high orders for capacity when the price is attractive and makes low orders for 
capacity when the price is not attractive. In turn, this decision making approach may lead to 
oscillations in the licenses prices (Cramton and Stoff, 2006).  
As we presented in the Literature Survey, both the Procurement for Long Strategic Reserve Planning 
and the Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts can improve the market efficiency (price 
stabilization) and society’s welfare (de Vries, 2004; Bidwell ,2005; Meunier y Finon, 2006; Cramton 
and Stoft, 2006). Therefore, based on the simulations we have performed, we estimate the Average 
value and the Standard deviation of the Economic Surplus for each of the treatments. The Economic 
Surplus is the sum of the Consumer Surplus and the Producer Surplus. The Consumer Surplus is the 
area under the demand curve (Eq 1), defined by the market’s capacity and the difference between 
the maximum price and the market price (triangle shape). The Producer Surplus is the area under 
the demand curve (Eq 1) defined by the market’s capacity and the difference between the market’s 
price and the producers cost. Equations 9, 10 and 11 illustrate this. 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 =
(𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗ 𝑄𝑡
2
                           (9) 
 





𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠                   (11)   
 
With these equations, we calculate the Economic Surplus for Treatment 1 and 2. For treatment 3, 
we include the cost for the government. Therefore, the Economic Surplus for Treatment 3 is the 
sum of the Consumer and Producer’s Surplus minus the cost to government. The cost to the 
government is calculated as follows 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑜𝑣 =   {
2 ∗ 𝐿𝑝 ∗ 𝑌𝑖,𝑡        𝐼𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 
0                   𝐼𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑
                            (12)  
 
When there are subsidized prices, the government incurs in a double cost. There is the 
tangible cost of the subsidies and there is the opportunity cost of those public resources 
going to subsidies when they could be used to meet other public needs.  We test Economic 
Surplus using the Average value and the Standard deviation to test for both expected value 
and stability. Table 4 shows these results of the Economic Surplus calculations for all the three 
Treatments. 
 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Average Economic Surplus 121.13 124.44 123,98 
Standard deviation of the 
Economic Surplus 
5.11 0.78 0,31 
Table 4: Average value and Standard deviation of the Economic Surplus for each of the treatments simulations. 
 
As Table 4 shows, both Treatments 2 and 3 present more desirable scenarios for society’s welfare 
than Treatment 1. Treatment 2 shows the highest Average value and a minor Standard deviation for 
Economic Surplus than Treatment 1, which means that the Procurement for Long Strategic Reserve 
Planning could offer a higher and more stable society’s welfare. Treatment 3 shows a similar case, 
where the average value is increased and the standard deviation is reduced when compared with 
Treatment 1. Treatment 3 shows the lowest Standard deviation and the second highest Average 
value. Hence, both treatments 2 and 3 show better market scenarios than Treatment 1 as the 
literature suggests.   
The two mechanisms seem to improve the society’s welfare state. However, our simulations suggest 
that there is no clear dominance between the mechanism i.e. they both improve the market, but 
each one improves one measure (average value, standard deviation) more than the other does. This 
appreciation seems to be contrary to what we presented in the mechanisms’ evaluation in chapter 




(Procurement for long strategic reserve planning) and the mechanism considered for Treatment 3 
(Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts). Both mechanisms present good results for price 
stabilization (de Vries, 2004; Meunier y Finon, 2006; Vasquez et al., 2003). However, in comparison, 
there seems to be a preference for the mechanism we test in Treatment 3 (Centralised auctioning 
for capacity contracts) in regard of its results in investment stability, market consistency and 
market’s capacity goal reaching (Fignon y Pignon, 2008; Bidwell, 2005; Cramton and Stoft, 2006). 
Therefore, we also want to see whether the benefits obtained by society with Centralised auctioning 
for capacity contracts are significantly greater than the ones obtained with Procurement for long 
strategic reserve planning or vice versa in our experiments. The next chapter presents and overview 

























8. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In this section, we show the experimental results. We conducted two markets for both Treatments 
2 and 3, while for Treatment 1 we used two randomly selected markets from Arango and Moxnes 
(2012). First, we present an overview of the results and then we present the hypotheses tests. 
8.1. Results’ overview: 
 
Since we are primarily studying the long-term security of supply, we focus our analysis in the 
development of two main variables, price and capacity. While our main interest lies in the 
occurrence of cycles in the electricity’s price, we consider that price behavior is determined by 
capacity behavior in our experimental designs; thus, we decided to consider both variables for our 
analysis. Figure 11 shows price behavior for the two markets of each treatment we consider. 
Although formal tests are needed, visual inspections is a first assessment of cycles in a variable’s 
behavior, such as price (Ricci, 2003). Both Treatments 1 and 2 seem to present cyclical tendencies 
in all of their respective markets. On the other hand, Treatment 3 does not show any variation in 
price because its design keeps the total market capacity constant. Therefore, in Treatment 3 it is 










Figure 11: Prices of the three treatments 
Price behavior depends on capacity, but total capacity is different for each treatment. Thus, we 










Figure 12: Capacity of the three treatments. 
For both price and capacity, we find that there seems to be cyclical tendencies in Treatments 1 and 
2. In the Treatment 1, for the first market, we found price cycles with an increasing price tendency 
(i.e. decreasing capacity tendency) and for the second market we found cycles with no evident 
tendency and bigger rise and fall movements in comparison with the first market. In Treatment 2, 
for the first market, we found cycles with no evident tendency and marked rise and fall movements, 
conversely, in the second market, we found cycles with increasing price tendency and less marked 
rise and fall movements. In addition, there does not seem to be significant difference between the 
cyclical tendencies of Treatments 1 and 2. Table 5 shows summary statistics for the price behavior 
in each of the three treatments.  
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
 AP SD CV 𝛼 AP SD CV 𝛼 AP SD CV 𝛼 
M1 1,18 0,43 0,36 0,89 0,59 0,49 0,83 0,91 1,00 0,00 0,00 - 
M2 1,07 0,75 0,71 0,88 1,15 0,72 0,63 0,96 1,00 0,00 0,00 - 
Table 5: Summary statistics for treatments’ price. AP= Average Price, SD= Standard Deviation, CV= Coefficient 
of Variation and 𝛼= one-lag autocorrelation coefficient. 
An overview of the results suggests cyclical tendencies in both Treatments 1 and 2, and, as expected, 
stable behavior in Treatment 3 by design. The Coefficient of Variation is greater than 0.5 for the two 
markets in Treatment 2 and for one in Treatment 1, the 𝛼 shows high correlation between prices in 
different sets of times for all the markets in both Treatment 1 and 2. Furthermore, these statistics 
suggest that the inclusion of a regulatory firm causes greater variability in the price and stronger 
cyclical tendencies.  
Moreover, we present the same analysis for capacity to seek indications of cyclical behavior. Table 
6 shows the summary statistics for the capacity behavior in each of the three treatments. 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
 AC SD CV 𝛼 AC SD CV 𝛼 AC SD CV 𝛼 
M1 48,16 4,32 0,09 0,89 55,53 6,95 0,13 0,94 50,00 0,00 0,00 - 
M2 49,51 7,79 0,16 0,88 48,95 7,92 0,16 0,96 50,00 0,00 0,00 - 
Table 6: Summary statistics for treatments’ capacity. AC= Average Capacity, SD= Standard Deviation, CV= Coefficient 




The summary statistics for capacity shows significant variations (CV) in capacity. Such variations in 
capacity lead to variations in price due to the linear relationship between the two variables. 
Moreover, the one-lag autocorrelation coefficient shows high values for the two markets in both 
Treatments 1 and 2, which suggests cyclical tendencies in capacity behavior in prices, which in turn 
causes cyclical behavior in prices. In addition, the capacity and price average values are closer to the 
Perfect Competition values (capacity= 50.00, Price=1.00) than to the Cournot-Nash values 
(capacity=41.66, Price=1.83). This is consistent with previous experiments for Treatment 1 (Arango 
and Moxnes, 2012; Arango et al, 2013).  
Since Treatment 3 has a fixed market production by design, the price will always be constant. Hence, 





Figure 13: Licenses price behavior for Treatment 3 
Experimental results for Treatment 3 show variations in the licenses price, forming ups and downs 
in a similar way that our simulations suggested. To assess differences in society’s welfare, we first 
calculate the Economic Surplus for every market. Table 7 shows the Consumer, Producer and 




 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
Units: Experimental 
money 
M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
AES 123.91 122,02 121,58 121,95 122,57 123,19 
SES 1,41 3,60 4,55 3,40 2,38 1,75 
Treatment Average  122,97 121,76 122,88 
Treatment SD 2,89 4,00 2,11 
Table 7: Results of average Economic Surplus (AES) and standard deviation for Economic Surplus (SEC) 
for every market with the corresponding average and standard deviation values for each treatment. 
Results of the experiments show that neither Treatment 2 nor 3 present a higher Economic Surplus 
than Treatment 1. Moreover, these results show that Treatment 2 has the greatest standard 
deviation of the three treatments and the lowest average value, which means that our first 
mechanism (Procurement for long strategic reserve planning) presents the worse market scenario.  
We now proceed to sketch our formal hypotheses testing.  
In a comparative analysis of the three treatments, we found that Treatment 1 presented the highest 
average Economic Surplus and second highest standard deviation of the three. We also found that 
Treatment 2 reports the lowest average Economic Surplus and highest standard deviation. In 
addition, while we were not expecting total cyclical tendency elimination in Treatment 2, we 
expected some reduction, as our simulations suggests. However, we did not find any significant 
reduction from Treatment 1 to Treatment 2 in the cyclical tendency. These preliminary findings 
suggest that, under the assumptions we run the markets, Procurement for long strategic reserve 
planning could make the market less profitable and less stable than it was before such mechanism 
was included. Conversely, Treatment 3 reports an average Economic Surplus that is almost the same 
as the one reported by Treatment 1 and the standard deviation of the Economic Surplus of 
Treatment 3 is significantly minor than Treatment 1. Under the assumptions we run the markets, 
these pilot experimental results suggest the Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts could 
improve the stability of the market prices, without reducing the total benefits for society. 
8.2. Hypothesis testing: 
 
We turn now to sketch the test of the hypotheses. We must consider that these are pilot 
experiments, and thus, we do not aim to present them as formal test. Instead, our experiments are 
expected to provide initial indication of both the result and improvement of the experimental 
design. 
Hypothesis 1: Average prices in all treatments are equal to their respective Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium values.  
To test this hypothesis, we use 95% confidence intervals for both prices and capacities to perform 
an Acceptance region hypothesis testing. We use an adjusted statistic (Z) to see if the treatments’ 
average prices are statistically different from their respective Cournot-Nash equilibrium values. 





 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Z 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 
CN  1,83 1,83 1,67 1,67 NA NA 
AP 1,18 1,07 0,59 1,15 1,00 1,00 
SD 0,43 0,75 0,49 0,72 0,00 0,00 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Ad SD 0,05 0,09 0,06 0,09 0,00 0,00 
Ad Z -12,69 -8,60 -18,66 -6,11 NA NA 
Table 8: Summary of price results for Hypothesis 1. Z is the statistical value for the given confidence interval, CN is 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium value, AP is the average price, SD is the standard deviation of the price, N is the number 
of periods taken, Ad SD is the standard deviation adjusted for the number of samples (
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁
) and Ad Z is the statistical 
value to be proved (
𝐴𝑃−𝐶𝑁
𝐴𝑑 𝑆𝐷
). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected. 
 Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 
 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 
Z 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 1,96 
CN Value 41,66 41,66 43,33 43,33 NA NA 
AC 48,16 49,51 50,66 42,22 50,00 50,00 
SD 4,32 7,79 9,92 11,92 0,00 0,00 
N 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Ad SD 0,51 0,93 1,18 1,42 0,00 0,00 
Ad Z 12,69 8,49 6,23 -0,79 N/A N/A 
Table 9: Summary of capacity results for Hypothesis 1. Z is the statistical value for the given confidence interval, CN is 
the Cournot-Nash equilibrium value, AC is the average capacity, SD is the standard deviation of the capacity, N is the 
number of periods taken, Ad SD is the standard deviation adjusted for the number of sample (
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁
) and Ad Z is the 
statistical value to be proved (
𝐴𝐶−𝐶𝑁
𝐴𝑑 𝑆𝐷
). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected. 
If the Ad Z value falls within the acceptance region (-Z, Z), we fail to reject the hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, in this case, only the Ad Z value for capacity in M2 of Treatment 2 fulfills such 
condition. Therefore, we reject the Cournot-Nash hypothesis, that is, average prices in all 
treatments are not equal to their respective Cournot-Nash equilibrium values as the Perfect 
Rationality theory suggests. Instead, prices reached levels closer to competitive prices, which is 
consistent with previous experiments (Arango and Moxnes, 2012; Arango et al. 2013). 
 
Hypothesis 2: Treatments 1 and 2 show cyclical behavior. 
For this hypothesis, we perform an analysis of the autospectra11and autocorrelograms (with a 95% 
confidence interval) of the price series for both Treatments 1 and 2. Figure 14 shows the results for 
the prices in both treatments. 
                                                          
11 When calculating the auto spectra, we use the last 64 out of 70 data points because the Fourier transform 




 Figure 14: Time series, autospectra and autocorrelograms for the market prices of Treatments 1 and 2 
The autocorrelograms show significant numbers for three or more lags for every market, which is 
consistent with cyclical behavior. The autospectra show frequencies concentrations in all the 
markets, which suggest the prices’ time series do not come from random process12. M2 of 
Treatment 1 shows significant concentrations in different frequencies, which suggest that there 
could be more than one cycle in operation in that single market. The cycles' periods showed by the 
auto spectra range from 13 to 50 years in length (from 0.075 in T1M2 to 0.02 in T1M1 frequency 
concentrations). 
In order to consider the implications derived from delays in the economic model, and the linear 
relationship between variables, we use the same analysis for capacities. The results for capacities 
are consistent with the results for prices, i.e., we find significant numbers in the autocorrelograms 
for at least the first three lags and we also find significant frequency concentrations in the auto 
spectra. Figure 15 shows the results of the capacity analysis. 
                                                          
12 For a perfectly random process, the autospectra does not show any significant frecuency concentration 
and the autocorrelogram does not show significant correlation in the lags (the correlation are within the 
significance limits). For a perfectly cyclical process, the autospectra shows one significant frequency 
concentration (the period) and the autocorrelogram shows significant positive correlation for the first 





Figure 15: Time series, autospectra and autocorrelograms for market capacities of Treatments 1 and 2. 
In general, both prices and capacities show behaviors consistent with the presence of cycles in 
Treatments 1 and 2. Both treatments present autospectra with frequencies concentration and 
significant numbers in the autocorrelograms, indicating that neither prices nor capacities behave as 
a random process over time. 
With respect to the double cycle presence (Sterman, 2000; Randers and Göluke, 2007), we do not 
find strong indications of it. While there are multiple concentrations in the prices´ autospectra in 
T1M2, this could be caused by adjustments in the players’ strategies overtime (the market switches 
from one cycle to another as the time advances). If time were increased, these strategic adjustments 
may appear, showing different cycles in different times. Nevertheless, formal experiments are 
needed to explore this issue. 
Based on the results we obtained, we fail to reject the cycles’ hypothesis. This suggests that the 
inclusion of a regulatory firm does not seem to contribute to price stabilization. However, due to 
the limitation of pilots experimental markets considered in this thesis; it is worth to carry on more 
experimental markets to have better insights regarding the effects of including a regulatory firm in 
a deregulated electricity market. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Treatments 2 and 3 present better scenarios for society’s welfare than Treatment 1. 
In order to compare Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 to Treatment 1, we performed two Acceptance 
region hypothesis tests. Table 10 shows the results of the hypothesis test we performed to check 













Ad SD 0,47 
Ad Z 2,58 
Table 10: Summary of results for Hypothesis 3. Difference in Economic Surplus between Treatments 1 and 2. Z is the 
statistical value for the given confidence interval, BD is the benchmark for the difference between economic surplus 
values, AD is the average difference, SD is the standard deviation of the difference, N is the number of periods taken, 
Ad SD is the standard deviation adjusted for the number of samples (
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁




). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected. 
Since Ad Z does not fall within the acceptance region (-Z, Z), the difference between the Economic 
Surplus of Treatments 1 and 2 is significantly greater than zero. Therefore, we find no evidence in 
the experimental results to state that Treatment 2 leads to a greater Economic Surplus than 
Treatment 1 i.e. Treatment 1 Economic surplus is, in fact, significantly greater than Treatment 2m 
Economic surplus. We now show in Table 11 the summary of the hypothesis test we performed to 
check whether the difference between Treatment 1’s Economic Surplus is statistically greater than 







Ad SD 0,32 
Ad Z 0,27 
Table 11: Summary of results for Hypothesis 3. Difference in Economic Surplus between Treatments 1 and 3.Z is the 
statistical value for the given confidence interval, BD is the benchmark for the difference between economic surplus 
values, AD is the average difference, SD is the standard deviation of the difference, N is the number of periods taken, 
Ad SD is the standard deviation adjusted for the number of samples (
SD
√N




). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected. 
Since the Ad Z falls within the acceptance region (-Z, Z), the difference between the Economic 
Surplus of Treatments 1 and 3 is not significantly greater than zero. Therefore, we find no evidence 
in the experimental results to state that the auction market considered in Treatment 3 leads to a 
greater Economic Surplus than the base case or Treatment 1.  
Based on these pilot results, we cannot state that neither Treatment 2 nor 3 lead to a greater 
Economic Surplus due to the inclusion of the corresponding capacity mechanisms. Hence, we reject 
the better society’s welfare hypothesis (Hypothesis 3). Compared to Treatment 1, Treatment 3 
shows a reduction in the standard deviation of the Economic Surplus, while it keeps a statistically 
equal average value. On the other hand, Treatment 2 shows an increase in the standard deviation 




Now, to compare both capacity mechanisms, we performed a hypothesis test to check whether the 
difference between the average Economic Surplus in Treatments 2 and 3 is significantly different 








Ad SD 0,37 
Ad Z 3,01 
Table 12: Summary of results for the difference in Economic Surplus between Treatments 2 and 3.Z is the statistical 
value for the given confidence interval, BD is the benchmark for the difference between economic surplus values, AD 
is the average difference, SD is the standard deviation of the difference , N is the number of periods taken, Ad SD is 
the standard deviation adjusted for the number of samples (
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁




). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected 
Since the Ad Z does not fall within the acceptance region of (-Z, Z), the average difference is 
statistically significant, i.e., Treatment 3 reports a significantly higher Economic Surplus than 
Treatment 2. That is, the Centralized auctioning for contracts presents better results than 
Procurement for long strategic reserve planning as the literature suggest.  In addition, Treatment 2 
shows results we were not expecting, we performed a comparison between the actual Economic 
Surplus of treatment 2 and the resulting Economic surplus if the regulator firm results were not 
taken into account, the resulting Economic Surplus were 120,56. Table 13 shows the Acceptance 
region hyphotesis test we performed to compare this hypothetical value for treatment 2 (120, 56) 







Ad SD 0,35 
Ad Z 3,54 
Table 13: Summary of results for the difference in Economic Surplus between Treatments 2 with the regulator firm 
results included and excluded. Z is the statistical value for the given confidence interval, BD is the benchmark for the 
difference between economic surplus values, AD is the average difference, SD is the standard deviation of the 




)  and Ad Z is the statistical value to be proved (
𝐴𝐷−𝐵𝐷
𝐴𝑑 𝑆𝐷
). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the 
hypothesis is rejected. 
Since the Ad Z does not fall within the acceptance region of (-Z, Z), the average difference is 
statistically significant, i.e., if the regulator were not present in the market, the Economic surplus 




Another concern in our analysis of the third hypothesis is the Producer Surplus in treatment 3. This 
concerns is based on the seen in the licenses price behavior with its variations. Therefore we 
performed an Acceptance region hypothesis test to see if the average profit of Treatment 3 (-0.39) 







Ad SD 2,87 
Ad Z 0,92 
Table 14: Summary of results summary for the difference in Producer Surplus between Treatments 1 and 3. Z is the 
statistical value for the given confidence interval, BD is the benchmark for the difference between economic surplus 
values, AD is the average difference, SD is the standard deviation of the difference , N is the number of periods 
taken, Ad SD is the standard deviation adjusted for the number of samples (
𝑆𝐷
√𝑁




). If Ad Z does not fall within the interval (-Z, Z), the hypothesis is rejected. 
Since the Ad Z fall within the acceptance region of (-Z, Z), the average difference is not statistically 
significant, i.e., this test confirms that the statistical equality between the Economic Surplus of 
Treatment 1 and 3 is not caused by losses in agents profits. Therefore, not only Treatment 3 
preserves the society’s welfare, it also preserves the agents profits (Producer Surplus). 
In both Treatment 1 and 2, we found indications of cycles in capacities and prices in the pilot 
experimental markets considered. We found significant numbers in the autocorrelograms (for three 
or more lags), frequency concentrations in the autospectra, significant values for the coefficient of 
variation and high values for the one-lag autocorrelation coefficient. This type of behavior is 
consistent with previous works with simulation models and experiments (Olsina et al., 2006; de Vries 
and Heijnen, 2008; Arango and Moxnes, 2012; Arango et al., 2013).  With respect to the general 
price and capacity behavior, we found, on average, a tendency closer to the Perfect Competition 
than to the Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the two markets.  
In Treatment 3, we found stable electricity price behavior in the two experimental markets, since 
this treatment design fixes the total market capacity. Regarding the licenses price behavior, we 
found a tendency towards variations similarly to the variations presented by our simulations. 
However, even with these variations in licenses’ price, the Economic Surplus is significantly more 
stable in this treatment than it is in the others. These results are also consistent with other works 
that suggest that centralized auctions could help to stabilize market prices by reducing the risk of 
non-desired capacity investment behavior derived from price signals (Cramton and Stoft, 2006; 
Moreno et al., 2007, 2008).  
In the next chapter, we present our conclusions, discuss some implications that the results might 





9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this chapter, we present the main findings of this work. First, we present a review of the main 
findings derived from the hypotheses tests we performed. Then, we discuss some implications of 
our findings related to market dynamics. Finally, we discuss some of the limitations of the work and 
propose further research based on such limitations. 
9.1. Findings: 
 
This thesis presented a series of simulations and experimental treatments to study the effects of 
two capacity mechanisms, namely Procurement for long strategic reserve planning and Centralised 
auctioning for capacity contracts in a deregulated electricity market. The pilot experiment 
conducted for Treatment 1 and 2 only gives first indicatives of how the formal experimental results 
might be.  We explored the occurrence of cycles and the social welfare in three treatments: First, 
we considered as a base case a deregulated electricity market with full capacity utilization 
(Treatment 1), which is the most complex case of Arango and Moxnes (2012). Second, we 
introduced a computer-operated firm that acted as a regulator of the market (Treatment 2); and 
third, we introduced an auction for licenses system to the base case (Treatment 3).   
Previous works in simulation and experimental economics have shown cyclical behaviors (Olsina et 
al., 2006; Randers and Göluke, 2007; Arango and Moxnes, 2012; Arango et al., 2013). Other works 
have addressed the cycles issue by including variations like futures markets (Alvarez, 2013) and 
mothballing (Arango et al., 2013) in experimental settings like the one proposed by Arango and 
Moxnes (2012). Hence, we study the rationality of individuals’ decisions in three different 
treatments, evaluating the long-term security of supply and the society’s welfare. 
We use simulation to study the expected market behavior. For Treatment 1, we replicate the 
analysis made by Arango and Moxnes (2012), which shows cyclical price behavior with increasing 
amplitude. For Treatment 2, we found cyclical price behavior without increasing amplitude. Finally, 
for Treatment 3, we found stable electricity price behavior with stable licenses price. In addition, it 
is noteworthy to point out that in Treatment 3, we found strong tendency to negative licenses prices 
(subsidies)   
The simulations we performed show consistency with the experimental results of Treatment 1, as 
they show cyclical behavior. For Treatment 2, however, the simulations suggested a reduction in 
price volatility compared to Treatment 1, which did not correspond to the results of the 
experiments. The experiments showed no significant reduction in price volatility from Treatment 1 
to Treatment 2, along with a reduction of the average Economic Surplus and an increase of the 
standard deviation of the Economic surplus, making this treatment the less profitable and the less 
stable of the three from the society’s welfare point of view. For Treatment 3, our simulations 
suggested variations in licenses’ price. The experimental results confirmed the electricity price 
stability and some variations in the licenses’ price. This treatment reports a statistically equal 
average Economic Surplus to Treatment 1 and the lowest standard deviation of the Economic 





We conclude that these pilot experiments shows initial indications about the study of Procurement 
for long strategic reserve planning and Centralized auctioning for capacity contracts. These pilot 
experiments provides a starting point to run formal experiments to test out our hypotheses. 
9.2. Implications: 
 
We compared three scenarios: a deregulated electricity market with no capacity mechanism 
(Treatment 1), a second market with a regulatory firm to test the Procurement for long strategic 
reserve planning mechanism (Treatment 2), and a third market with an auctions system to test the 
Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts mechanism. 
Our analysis is based only on two pilot experiments, which means that the results are not conclusive 
but provides some indications. Results show tendency in the sense that the introduction of a 
regulatory firm (Procurement for long strategic reserve planning mechanism) does not seem to have 
beneficial effects on the market’s long-term security of supply. First, we found no evidence of cycle-
mitigation potential in this mechanism. Furthermore, we found that, regarding the Economic 
Surplus of the market, the inclusion of a regulator could reduce its expected value and increase its 
volatility. These results appear to be counterintuitive since one may be tempted to think that having 
a firm that secures part of a capacity (price) goal should have a stabilizing effect (de Vries, 2004; 
Fignon and Pignon, 2008). In fact, this train of thought is supported by the simulations we did. 
Further variations in the settings to test this mechanism may present different results. 
We also found that the introduction of an auctions system seems to offer beneficial effects in the 
long-term security of supply to the electricity markets. First, the market structure we considered 
sets a fixed capacity (and thus, fixes the price) for the market, which automatically eliminates any 
possibility of cycles. Second, we found that this treatment does not seem to present any significant 
effect on the average Economic Surplus, but it does seem to stabilize its value, that is, the market 
keeps its profitability but with greater stability. These results suggest that the cost to the 
government is outweighed by the market’s improvements in stability in the long term.  
The internal validity of the experiment is ensured, since cause (players’ decisions), settings 
(regulatory firm, auction system) and effect (price behavior) can be isolated and examined. 
Therefore, cause and effect relationships can be established. The external validity of the experiment 
is greatly influenced by the fact that we do not have conclusive results, since our results are only 
indicatives obtained from pilot experiments. However, we make some remarks about this point: 
First, the results obtained in Treatment 3 are consistent with the literature evaluation of the 
mechanism Centralised auctioning for capacity contracts, since our results show stable electricity 
price behavior, and preservation of society’s welfare (Bidwell, 2005; Cramton and Stoft, 2006). 
Second, in Treatment 2 we found no consistency between the literature evaluation of the 
mechanism Procurement for long strategic reserve planning, since we did not find price stabilization 
potential nor beneficial effects for society’s welfare (de Vries, 2004; Meunier and Finon, 2006). In 
addition, we found that the most market compatible mechanism (Centralized auctioning for 
capacity contracts) presents better results than the interventionist mechanism (Procurement for 
long strategic reserve planning) as the literature suggests (de Vries, 2004; Meunier and Finon, 2006; 




Considering that this is a pilot experiment, our results suggest, that the Centralised auctioning for 
capacity contracts is a better option than Procurement for long strategic reserve planning for the 
long-term security of supply, regarding price stabilization and society’s welfare. While the first 
preserves and stabilizes the Economic Surplus, and eliminates cycles, the second does not seem to 
solve the cycle’s occurrence and it seems to reduce and even destabilize the Economic Surplus. 
However, we must acknowledge the possibility of different results if the Procurement for long 
strategic reserve planning is tested in a different experimental design (e.g. considering variations in 
the regulator capacity). Furthermore, in the terms we tested it, Centralised auctioning for capacity 
contract presents a market-oriented structure because it just sets new of rules for competition. 
Conversely, in the terms we tested it, Procurement for long strategic reserve planning is an 
interventionist mechanism, which by definition is not consistent with free competition as a market 
principle (Fignon and Pignon, 2008). 
9.3. Limitations and further research 
 
This thesis presents indicative results obtained from pilot experiments, which means our results are 
not conclusive. This is both our first limitation and our first work for future research, which means 
that we should perform the formal experiments.  
This work represents an extension of previous experiments (Alcaraz, 2010; Arango and Moxnes, 
2012); however, our experimental treatments still have simplifying assumptions. Further research 
could consider other extensions to increase external validity. For instance, none of our treatments 
takes into account any dynamic behavior in demand, which could influence the long-term security 
of supply in a market (Ford, 1999). Further experimental designs may deal with this issue. 
Our experimental design also assumes no bankruptcy, that is, individuals can invest regardless of 
their firms’ financial state. This issue poses both theoretical and practical challenges to further 
experimental designs. On one hand, the possibility of a variable number of individuals (their initial 
number is reduced as they go bankrupt), implies that the economic model could have a dynamic 
behavior as the market equilibrium change. On the other hand, one has to define a benchmark for 
bankruptcy (i.e., individuals with less than a certain amount of experimental money in their firms’ 
bank accounts are bankrupt and, thus, out of the game). Furthermore, this bankruptcy possibility 
may include also a possibility for individuals to get loans or government incentives. Therefore, 
further works should consider these financial aspects in order to have more realistic experimental 
markets. 
We did not also consider any issue regarding uncertainty in the experimental markets. Some of the 
variables in a market have a stochastic behavior (Moxnes, 2012). In our case, for instance, the 
availability of the resource needed for electricity generation or the price determination itself. The 
first relates to the possibility of having a generation capacity that is affected by some non-fully 
predictable event (e.g., the hydrological cycle), while the second refers to lack of correspondence 
between the production capacity and the price for some reason (e.g., political and economic 
changes in a country). The presence of uncertainties can influence individuals’ behavior, as they 
make strategic adjustments to their decisions to protect themselves from non-desirable scenarios 
(Just and Weninger, 1997); hence, further experiments could consider uncertainties to improve the 




The consideration of different generation technologies is another feature of realism that is lacking 
in our experimental design. Generation technologies differ in aspects like construction time, lifetime 
and economics. The construction time we consider in this experiment (4 years), is fairly close to the 
construction time of a medium-sized hydro plant, while other technologies have a minor 
construction time (e.g., fossil power plants) and others have greater construction times (e.g., large-
sized hydro plants). This difference in construction times (difference in delays) may have a significant 
effect in the performance of the system, as previous work has shown that the greater the delays, 
the greater the instabilities in the market price (Diehl and Sterman, 1995; Arango and Moxnes, 
2012). The lifetime also differs from one technology to another (e.g., about 40 years for fossil fuels 
plants and 100 years for large-sized hydro plants), which can also contribute to different investment 
behaviors (Arango and Moxnes, 2012). Furthermore, the economics of every generation technology 
marks a distinctive difference from the others. For instance, events related to the hydrological cycle 
and the volatile cost of natural gas influence the economics of hydro power plants and gas turbine 
combined-cycle plants, respectively. Therefore, further experimental designs should consider 
different generation technologies in order to have more realistic market designs. Finally, our 
experimental can be adapted to embrace new elements that address these limitations to explore 
more capacity mechanisms and market scenarios. 
Finally, there are some practical concerns about the external validity of our experiment. The real 
implementation of the two capacity mechanisms studied in this thesis can present differences with 
our results. For instance, in Treatment 3, what would happen if players could avoid their obligation 
to build capacity? In Treatment 2, what would happen if the regulator’s capacity were expanded? 
What would happen if the regulator were not controlled by the model but for a human decision-
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Consider the main equations in this economic model, namely the price equation and the player’s 
profits equation. 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡                     (1) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗         (2) 
Since the sum of the players’ individual capacities is the total market production Q and we assume 
that all n players are identical, then we have 
 𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗                        (3) 
By replacing (3) in (1) we have 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗             (4) 
Then we replace (4) in (2) and we have  
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  (5) 
We now derive (5) with respect to 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  and equal it to zero, in order to find the maximum value 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑗
= 𝐴 − 2 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0   (6)   
We now find the value of 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 given that A=6, B=0.1, n=5 and 𝐶𝑖,𝑗=1 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐴 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
2 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛
   (7) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 1
2 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 5
= 5 
Since we now have the value of 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, we can find the values for 𝑄𝑡 and 𝑃, by replacing the value of 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 in (3) to obtain the value of 𝑄𝑡 and then replace this value in (1) to find 𝑃 
𝑄𝑡 = 5 ∗ 5 = 25 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 25 = 3.5 
Cournot-Nash: 
In this equilibrium, we follow the same process we followed in Joint Maximization. However, we 
now assume that each player maximize its own benefits while the other players’ benefits remain 




of the player that is making profit maximization. In mathematical terms, the previous statements 
can be described as:  
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
 = 1  (1) 
The starting point is the same as the Joint Maximization equilibrium with the price and profits 
equations. Like the previous case, we have the following equation: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  (2) 
We also know that: 
𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗   (3) 
We can rewrite (2) as: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 −  𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑄𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  (4) 
Since we have the assumption stated in (1), the derivation is: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0 (5) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑄𝑡 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0(6) 
By replacing (3) in (6), we have: 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − (𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 + 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝐵) − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0 (6) 
We then find the value for 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, and then we find the value for 𝑄𝑡 and  
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐴 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
𝐵 ∗ (𝑛 + 1)
  (7) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 = 
6 − 1
0.1 ∗ (5 + 1)
= 8.33 
𝑄𝑡 = 8.33 ∗ 5 = 41.66 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 41.66 = 1.83 
Perfect Competition: 
This equilibrium is achieved when the price is equal to the marginal cost, that is, when the profits 
are theoretically zero. This theoretical zero does not mean that the firms actually receive zero 
profits; rather it means that the firms receive the normal economic profit (no extra gains). 
Margin cost = 1 




















In this treatment, we based our derivations in the basic scheme of Treatment 1, but we now have 
to consider the regulatory firm. Therefore, we start with the same two equations of the previous 
treatment and the regulator contribution (RC = Regulator Contribution) to the total production 
capacity of the market: 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡                     (1) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗) ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗         (2) 
𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  + 𝑅𝐶                      (3) 
Since we know that the RC value depends on 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, we can form 3 intervals for this value: 
 
𝐼𝑓 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ≤ 40, 𝑅𝐶 = 10 
𝐼𝑓 40 > 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 < 50, 𝑅𝐶 = 50 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 
𝐼𝑓 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ≥ 50, 𝑅𝐶 = 0 
By examining these 3 intervals, we can conclude that the third interval does not have the Joint 
Maximization equilibrium since the players’ profits are 0 or negative in it. We can also conclude that 
since the price ranges from 2 to 0 in the second interval, this one does not have the equilibrium 
value since the maximum unitary profit in it is 1. Therefore, we know that the equilibrium lies in the 
first interval, where RC=10. Hence, we take RC as a constant equal to 10. 
We replace (3) in (1): 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗  𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑅𝐶   (4) 
We replace (4) in (2): 
𝜋𝑖,𝑗 = 𝐴 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗
2 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 (5) 






= 𝐴 − 2 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0 (6) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐴 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
2 ∗ 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛
 (7) 
Now we find the values of𝑞𝑖,𝑗, 𝑄𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡 
 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 10 ∗ 0.1 − 1
2 ∗ 0.1 ∗ 5
= 4 
𝑄𝑡 = 5 ∗ 4 + 10 = 30 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 30 = 3 
Cournot-Nash: 
For this equilibrium, we assume that 𝑄𝑡 changes as a result of a maximization process made by one 
player while the rest of the variables remain constant. 
𝜕𝑄𝑡
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
 = 1  (1) 
Which is the same as saying that, for this equilibrium, the derivation with respect to 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 is the same 






= −𝐵 (2) 









∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗  (3) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑃𝑡 −𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0    (4) 
We consider the price equation (5) and the production capacity equation (6):  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑄𝑡              (5) 
𝑄𝑡  = 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗  + 𝑅𝐶          (6)    
We replace (6) in (5) to replace them in (4) 
𝜕𝜋𝑖,𝑗
𝜕𝑞𝑖,𝑡
= 𝐴 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑛 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐵 ∗ 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗 = 0  (7)  
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐴 − 𝑅𝐶 ∗ 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑖,𝑗
𝐵(𝑛 + 1)




We now find the value for 𝑞𝑖,𝑗, 𝑄𝑡   and 𝑃𝑡 (we also assume RC=10 for this equilibrium for the margin 
intervals we explained in Joint Maximization) 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 =
6 − 10 ∗ 0.1 − 1
0.1 ∗ (5 + 1)
= 6.66 
𝑄𝑡  = 5 ∗ 6.66 + 10 = 43.33 
𝑃𝑡 = 6 − 0.1 ∗ 43.33 = 1.67 
Perfect Competition: 
This equilibrium is achieved when the price is equal to the marginal cost, that is, when the profits 
are theoretically zero. This theoretical zero does not mean that the firms actually receive zero 
profits; rather it means that the firms receive the normal economic profit (no extra gains). 
Margin cost = 1 
Price = Margin cost 









Since 𝑄𝑡 = 50 , 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑅𝐶 can make infinite combinations that sum 50 we have the following ranges 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 and 𝑅𝐶 that could add up to 50 units in combination: 
𝑞𝑖,𝑗 = [8, 10]   
𝑅𝐶 = [10, 0] 
Treatment 3: 
Since the market production capacity is fixed in this treatment, there is only one capacity and price 
scenario which is equivalent to the Perfect Competition equilibrium, that is 
𝑄𝑡 = 50 
𝑃𝑡 = 1 
In this treatment, the players bid in auctions or, in other words, the players compete for a share of 
the total market production capacity (which is fixed). Therefore, 𝑞𝑖,𝑗 behaves different for every 
individual according with the auctions results but always keeping the Perfect Competition 







To summarize the equilibriums:  
 T1 T2 T3 
 Cap Price Cap Price Cap Price 
JM 25.0 3.50 30.0* 3.00 NA NA 
CN 41.7 1.83 43.3* 1.67 NA NA 
PC 50.0 1.00 50.0* 1.00 50.0 1.00 
Market capacity (Cap) and Price for Joint Maximization (JM), Cournot-Nash (CN) and 
Perfect Competition (PC) equilibria. *In this treatment, a regulator firm intervenes, 
so the individual investments of the players do not match with the market 































ADVERTENCIA: NO TOQUE EL COMPUTADOR HASTA QUE SE LE INDIQUE LO CONTRARIO 
INTRODUCCIÓN 
 
Bienvenidos. Éste es un experimento de toma de decisiones apoyado por la Vicerrectoría Nacional 
de Investigación de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. El caso es un mercado eléctrico 
desregulado. Las instrucciones son simples y si las sigue cuidadosamente y toma buenas decisiones 
usted podría ganar una suma de dinero considerable, la cual será entregada en efectivo al final del 
experimento. Usted va a jugar el rol de un productor de electricidad que vende dicha electricidad 
en un mercado. Cada período usted tomará decisiones de inversión que afectarán su producción 
futura. Su objetivo es maximizar las ganancias a lo largo de todos los períodos del experimento. 
Entre mayores sean sus ganancias acumuladas, mayor será su pago. 
 
ESTRUCTURA DEL MERCADO 
Usted es uno entre cinco productores de electricidad. Usted no sabe quiénes son los otros jugadores 
en el mercado y cómo se desempeñan individualmente. Sus ganancias son estimadas como: 
 
Ganancias = Producción • (Precio – Costos) 
 
𝜋𝑡  =  𝑞𝑡  ∙  (𝑃𝑡  –  𝐶) 
 
Donde qt corresponde a su producción en el tiempo t, Pt al precio de la electricidad en el tiempo t 
y C a los costos tanto de operación como de capital, que son constantes y equivalen a 1 
 E$/Unidad. Su producción no puede ser negativa y siempre debe estar por debajo de 20 
unidades, que es un límite superior que garantiza un mínimo de competencia. El precio de la 
electricidad es fijado para equilibrar el suministro total y la demanda. El suministro total es la suma 
de la producción de los cinco jugadores, y la demanda es sensitiva al precio así: 
𝑃𝑡 =  6 –  0.1 ∗ 𝑄𝑡  
 





Para resumir, entre mayor sea la producción total de electricidad, menor es el precio. 
Respectivamente, entre menor sea la producción total de electricidad, mayor es el precio. No hay 
crecimiento económico, lo que significa que la demanda sólo cambia debido a cambios del precio. 
 
 
Curva de demanda. 
 
PRODUCCIÓN 
Su producción será siempre igual a su capacidad de producción, lo que significa que usted no puede 
reducir su utilización de capacidad. Cada año usted toma decisiones de inversión en capacidad 
nueva (usted puede decidir 0 Unidades). Características importantes de los generadores de 
electricidad son: 
 
Retraso en la construcción = 4 años. 
Tiempo de vida de la capacidad instalada = 16 años. 
Esto significa que si usted decide invertir en una capacidad adicional de 0.8 Unidades en el año 6, 
esta capacidad estará bajo construcción por 4 años y añadirá 0.8 Unidades a su capacidad en el año 
10. Esta capacidad adicional durará hasta el año 26 inclusive. 
 
CONDICIÓN INICIAL 
Cuando el experimento comience, los administradores anteriores de la firma han invertido una 
cantidad constante de 11 Unidades/vida útil = 0.69 Unidades/año por un largo tiempo. 
Consecuentemente, usted comienza con una capacidad de producción de 11 Unidades y una tasa 
de depreciación de 0.69 Unidades/año. Todas las firmas son idénticas, tienen los mismos costos y la 




firmas = 55 Unidades; para un producción total de 55 Unidades, el precio es 0.5 E$/Unidad. Esto 
significa que inicialmente todos están operando con precios más bajos que sus costos. 
 
PAGO 
Usted recibirá un pago de acuerdo a su desempeño. Su desempeño es medido por sus ganancias 
acumuladas. Entre mayores sean las ganancias acumuladas, mayor será el pago. El pago estará entre 
Col $10.000 y Col $45.000. 
 
CORRIENDO EL EXPERIMENTO 
Sea cuidadoso, no presione “Accept Decisions” A MENOS QUE ESTÉ SEGURO. Luego de presionar 
“Accept Decisions” su decisión no puede ser cambiada. 
 
1. Mire la información disponible de la firma y el mercado y tome decisiones de inversión. 
2. Escriba sus decisiones en la hoja que le fue entregada (sus decisiones deben estar anotadas en la 
hoja pues ésta es su recibo para el pago) y presione “Accept Decisions”. 
3. Espere hasta que todos los participantes en el mercado hayan tomado sus decisiones. 
 
La ventana con el botón “Accept Decisions” aparece de nuevo, el juego ha avanzado al siguiente 
año. La información es actualizada y es tiempo de tomar decisiones nuevamente. La simulación 
correrá por un número indefinido de años. Cuando el experimentador pare el juego usted debe 
escribir sus ganancias acumuladas en la hoja y preguntar por su pago. Los pagos se harán en privado. 
 
NOTA 
De acuerdo al propósito del experimento se requiere no compartir ningún tipo de información 
(verbal, escrita, gestos, etc.). Por favor, respete estas reglas pues éstas son importantes para el valor 
científico del experimento. Romper las reglas implica que el grupo involucrado es anulado y sus 
participantes no reciben pago. 
 











ADVERTENCIA: ¡No toque el equipo hasta que se le indique! 
 
Bienvenidos. En este juego, usted va a jugar el papel de un productor de electricidad. Año a año, 
usted decide la cantidad a pedir de nueva capacidad de producción (centrales eléctricas). Su objetivo 
es maximizar los beneficios para todos los periodos del experimento. 
Usted es uno de los cinco productores de electricidad en un mercado y no sabe quiénes son sus 
competidores ni cómo operan individualmente.  
Las centrales eléctricas tienen una vida útil de 16 años y un período de construcción de 4 años, 
comprendido entre el momento que usted pide una nueva capacidad hasta que las nuevas 
estaciones comienzan a producir electricidad.  
Las ganancias anuales se dan por la producción multiplicada por la diferencia entre el precio y costos 
Unitarios. Los costos unitarios son constantes e iguales a 1 unidad de dinero experimental. 
 
𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑠 =  𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖ó𝑛 •  (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜 −  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑠) 
 
La capacidad de producción de cada jugador no puede ser negativa y debe estar por debajo de 20 
unidades. Piense en este límite superior como una regulación gubernamental de mantener un 
mínimo de competencia en el mercado.  
Cada año, la capacidad y la producción de electricidad están dadas por inversiones en años 
anteriores. La utilización de la capacidad es siempre el 100% para todos los jugadores, es decir que 
se asume que todas las centrales trabajan siempre a un 100% de su capacidad.  
Toda la electricidad producida por el mercado, se consume cada año. Entre más grande sea la 
producción total, menor será el precio al que se vende la electricidad. La relación exacta viene dada 
por una curva de demanda y se expresa como: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜 =  6 − 0,1 •  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑖ó𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ≥  0 
 
El precio no puede ser negativo y no hay crecimiento económico que influya en la demanda y los 
precios de la electricidad. La relación entre la producción total (eje x) y precios de la electricidad (eje 




                               
Gráfica 1. Relación entre la producción total y el precio. 
 
Cada año se deben tomar decisiones de inversión en nueva capacidad (se puede elegir 0 Unidades). 
Después de 4 años las nuevas inversiones se suman a la capacidad existente. La capacidad dura 
durante 16 años y se reduce automáticamente a medida que se van desechando las centrales 
antiguas. Por otra parte, se requiere que usted escriba el precio que espera para el año siguiente.  
Además de los otros participantes, usted interactuará con un regulador del mercado, operado el 
computador. Este regulador cuenta con una capacidad máxima de 10 unidades e invertirá si detecta 
que la capacidad total del mercado va a ser menor a 50 unidades.  
Al comenzar el experimento, los anteriores encargados de las empresas, han invertido una cantidad 
constante de 0.6875 unidades / año. Las 5 empresas de los jugadores son iguales, con los mismos 
costos unitarios y la misma capacidad inicial. El mercado comienza con capacidad inicial de 11 
unidades para una capacidad total de mercado de 55 unidades. En consecuencia, el precio es igual 
0.5 (dinero experimental) y los beneficios iniciales son iguales a -0.5. 
 
TAREAS DEL EXPERIMENTO 
TENGA CUIDADO DE NO PRESIONAR "aceptar las decisiones" a menos que realmente así lo quiera.  
Después de haber pulsado "aceptar las decisiones", su decisión para un año en particular ya no 
puede ser cambiada. 
1. Mire la información disponible para la empresa y el mercado. 
2. Haga su decisión de inversión y escriba en el cuadro de decisión. Tenga en cuenta, que tiene que 
tomar una decisión activa cada año. Si no escribe nada en el cuadro de decisión, la decisión será la 
misma que el año anterior debido a que su decisión de inversión anterior no se borra 
automáticamente. El programa no le permite elegir inversiones negativas o inversiones que excedan 
la capacidad máxima. 
3. Escriba su inversión en la hoja de papel asignada. 




5. Espere hasta que todos los participantes del mercado han tomado sus decisiones para el año en 
curso y comenzar en el punto 1 de nuevo, cuando la información para la toma de decisiones para el 
próximo año se convierte en disponible. 
 
El juego continuará hasta que se detenga por sí mismo en algún año futuro desconocido. 
 
NOTA: De acuerdo con el propósito del experimento, se requiere que usted no comparta ningún 
tipo de información (verbal, escrita, gestos, etc.) con los demás participantes. Por favor respete 
estas reglas, ya que son importantes para el valor científico del experimento.  
Si lo requiere puede hacer preguntas aclaratorias al personal encargado del experimento. 
 




PRECAUCIÓN: ¡No toque el equipo hasta que se le indique! 
 
En este juego, Usted va a jugar el papel de un productor de electricidad. Cada año, Usted decide 
cuanta capacidad nueva quiere ordenar (centrales eléctricas). Las órdenes se hacen por medio de 
ofertas en una subasta de licencias para construir nueva capacidad. 
Su objetivo es maximizar sus beneficios acumulados. Usted es uno de los cinco productores de 
electricidad en un mercado y no sabe quiénes son sus competidores, ni cómo se desempeñan 
individualmente. Las centrales eléctricas tienen una vida útil 16 años y tardan 4 años en construirse, 
es decir, si Usted decide construir una central hoy, dispondrá de ella dentro de 4 años y le durará 16 
años a partir de ese momento. Las ganancias anuales están dadas por la producción multiplicada 
por la diferencia entre el precio y los costos unitarios, menos el número de nuevas licencias 
adquiridas multiplicadas por su precio. 
 
𝐺𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜 − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑠 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡) −∗ 𝑁𝑢𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑠 ∗  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑜 𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎  
 
Los costos unitarios son constantes e iguales a 1 (dinero experimental/unidad). Las nuevas licencias 
reducen los beneficios si la subasta genera un precio positivo para las licencias. Si la subasta genera 
un precio negativo para las licencias, los beneficios aumentarán. Piense en este último caso como si 




La capacidad de cada jugador no puede ser negativa y debe estar por debajo de 20 unidades. Piense 
en este límite superior como una regulación gubernamental para mantener un mínimo de 
competencia en el mercado. Cada año, la capacidad para producir electricidad está dada por 
licencias entregadas en años anteriores. La utilización de la capacidad es siempre el 100% para todos 
los jugadores y toda la electricidad producida por los cinco productores se consume cada año. 
El gobierno determina la cantidad total de nuevas licencias cada año. La cantidad es configurada de 
tal manera que cada año el total de nuevas licencias sea igual al total de la capacidad que se ha 
vuelto obsoleta. Esto significa que la capacidad total en el mercado se mantiene constante en el 
tiempo. Puesto que suponemos que no hay crecimiento de la demanda a través del tiempo, el precio 
de la electricidad también se quedará constante e igual a 1 (dinero experimental/unidad). Esto 
significa que las ganancias anuales sólo dependen del número y precio de las nuevas licencias. 
Cada año se subastan nuevas licencias. Esto se hace mediante una gráfica de oferta donde se 
especifica el número de nuevas licencias que le gustaría recibir para diferentes precios. Usted puede 
manipular la gráfica moviendo el cursor sobre la gráfica, haciendo clic y arrastrando. Los precios de 
las licencias varían entre valores negativos (subsidios) y valores positivos. La gráfica de oferta debe 
ser definida de tal manera que usted pide menos licencias a medida que el precio aumenta y su 
oferta por un precio de 2.4 debe ser cero. Si estos requisitos no se cumplen, el programa le pedirá 
que corrija la gráfica.  
Cada año, el gobierno toma todas las gráficas de oferta y asigna nuevas licencias de manera que la 
cantidad total de nuevas licencias sea igual a la cantidad de capacidad que se vuelve obsoleta. Todos 
los jugadores terminan pagando (o recibiendo) el mismo precio (o subsidios) por las nuevas 
licencias. Cada jugador recibe la cantidad de nuevas licencias que él o ella ha especificado por el 
precio de equilibrio resultante. Nuevas Licencias conducen automáticamente a pedidos por nueva 
capacidad. Después de cuatro años, las nuevas licencias se suman a la capacidad existente. La 
capacidad dura durante dieciséis años y es reduce automáticamente cuando se desechan las 
centrales antiguas. 
Los gerentes anteriores de su empresa han recibido nuevas licencias y han invertido una cantidad 
constante de 0.625 unidades por año, durante mucho tiempo. Las 5 empresas son iguales, con los 
mismos costos unitarios y la misma capacidad inicial. El mercado comienza con una capacidad total 
inicial de 10 unidades para cada empresa y una capacidad total de mercado de 50 unidades. 
TENGA CUIDADO DE NO PRESIONAR "aceptar las decisiones" a menos que realmente lo desee. 
Después de haber pulsado "aceptar las decisiones", su decisión para ese año en particular ya no 
puede ser cambiada. 
 
1. Mire la información disponible para la empresa y el mercado. 
 
2.  Dibuje con el cursor su gráfica de oferta. El programa no permite que pida más cantidad cuando 
el precio aumenta (error lógico), ni que pida una cantidad mayor a cero cuando el precio es 2.4 




realiza ningún cambio en la gráfica de oferta, su decisión se tomará como si fuera igual que el 
año anterior, ya que su gráfica de oferta anterior no es borrada automáticamente. 
 
3. Pulse "aceptar las decisiones". 
 
4. Espere hasta que todos los participantes del mercado hayan tomado sus decisiones de oferta para 
el año en curso y recibir información de las ofertas el próximo año. Escriba su número de licencias 
asignadas en la hoja de papel de reporte. 
 
5. Comience en el punto 1 de nuevo. El juego continuará hasta que se detenga por sí mismo en algún 
año futuro desconocido. 
 
NOTA 
De acuerdo con el propósito del experimento, se requiere que usted no comparte ningún tipo de 
información (verbal, escrito, gestos, etc.) Por favor respeta estas reglas, ya que son importantes 
para el valor científico del experimento. Usted puede pedir aclaración preguntas. 
 

















APPENDIX 3: Software interfaces (in Spanish) 
 
Treatment 1: 
 
Treatment 2: 
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Treatment 3: 
 
 
